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Preface

This abstract discussion of conservation
decisions and of the optimum state of
conservation does not explain conservation
and depletion in actual situations of
resource use.

But such a discussion provides

the organizing principle by which actual
situations may be understood.

To use an analogy, the concepts of "climax
type" in ecology and "adaptive peak" in
genetics do not explain an actual plant
association or the developmental state of a
species at a particular time and place; nor
do they indicate that static states are
realizable or that the system which is being
considered is closed.

Still they are helpful

constructs in understanding the direction of
ceaseless change, the resultant of
environmental forces which can be observed at
a given time and place.

Similarly, the optimum state of conservation,
(iv)

both as an ex ante and an ex post concept is
a construct which is helpful as an organizing
principle in analyzing the result of economic
forces which influence conservation and
depletion. A study of these forces is the
central theme of the economics of
conservation."

(Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968), p.

93)
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ABSTRACT

RESOURCE USE RATES:

ESTIMATION OF TIME

INVARIANT DECISION RULES

By

Douglas John Lawrence
University of New Hampshire, May, 1987

The Abstract

As interest in soil conservation has increased,
understanding the soil management decision rule used by
farmers has become more important.

The model developed to

analyze the optimal decision rule for soil use rates is
essentially a supply response model which assumes rational
expectations.

It can be characterized as a dynamic optimal

control model with feedback from decisions to states.

Three

Stage Least Squares estimation is re-interpreted to fit the
requirements of rational expectations.

The estimated

coefficients suggest that soil conservation policy must
consider general economic variables as well as traditional
variables such as soil depth and cost sharing to be
successful.

(x)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Concern over the current and future effects of
water-induced soil erosion on soil productivity has
increased dramatically over the past decade.

For examples

of this concern see Crosson and Stout (1983); Risser (1978);
and Bovard (1984).

As an outgrowth of this concern a number

of economic models have been developed: Wade and Heady
(1977); Forster and Becker (1979); Osteen and Seitz (1978);
and Taylor and Frohberg (1977).

However, the preponderance

of these models are nonstochastic, static (often linear
programming) efforts.

Even those that have employed more

sophisticated techniques like optimal control are still
deterministic.

For examples of this work see McConnell

(1983); Burt (1981); Bhide, Pope and Heady (1982); Clark and
Furtan (1983); and Collins and Headley (1983).

The upshot

is that past research has had limitations for quantitatively
addressing the soil erosion problem.

More precisely, a

dynamic model which incorporates uncertainty and the effects
of exogenous variables is needed to evaluate the behavior of
farmers and their use of the soil resource.
Decisions concerning the use of soil depend, in part.

-2on the decision maker's expectations.

During the last

decade there has been a great deal of research which has
focused upon the formation of expectations.

This research

is important because expectations form the vital link
between accumulated information, present decisions and
future outcomes.
The agricultural economics literature surrounding
expectations is vast:

Askari and Cummings (1977) cite

hundreds of models developed with Nerlovian adaptive
expectations.

However, it was recognized by Muth (1961)

that such adaptive expectations do not satisfactorily
describe behavior.

Simply put, there is no theory to

support the speed of adjustment parameters in adaptive
expectations models.

In Muth’s words "...dynamic economic

models do not assume enough rationality..."

(p. 316).

In

short, Muth's concept of rational expectations provides a
modeling tool that enriches the neoclassical paradigm.
enrichment is achieved in two ways:

This

(1) It assumes that

individuals utilize information available to them to make
decisions (an optimizing of expectations);

(2) It forces

the researcher to address explicitly any apparent behavioral
drag factors, such as costs of adjustment.
Perhaps the best known use of rational expectations is
associated with the "Lucas Critique" (Lucas 1976).

Robert

Lucas demonstrated that an economic agent's behavior is not
invariant to changes in policy regiems; thus, the
reduced-form equation parameters cannot test the effects of

-3changes in exogenous variables.

Rational expectations has

been used extensively in various fields within macro
economics.

However, there is another area where rational

expectations use is growing:

resource economics.

(See

Eckstein (1984); Rosenman and Whiteman (1983); and Epple,
Hanson and Roberds (1982).)
This research will take the soil conservation policy
concerns generated during the last decade and apply recent
advances in modeling technology found in Whiteman (1983),
Hansen and Singleton (1982), Hansen and Sargent (1981),
Hansen and Sargent (1980) , Hansen (1982), Rosenman (1986) ,
and Sargent (1979) to generate a rational expectations model
of the soil resource.

The model will be based on the potato

production process in Aroostook County, Maine. Aroostook
County is used for a number of reasons.

Since data

availability is of primary importance and because Aroostook
County produces virtually all the potatoes grown in Maine,
any data which is reported only at the state level may be
relevant. In addition, because the potato industry dominates
the economy of Aroostook County, important countywide
variables may be appropriate. Furthermore, because the net
returns from the companion crop in the potato rotation
(oats) are essentially zero, it is possible to focus on
production of a single crop. Finally, Aroostook County has
been designated by the United States Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) as a "targeted" area eligible for increased
federal assistance, both technical and financial, for the

-4installation of erosion control practices.

1.1

1.1.1

The Soil Resource

The Nature of Soil
Before specifying a model of the soil resource, it

will be worthwhile to consider in some detail the physical
properties of soil.

Soils are basically the product of

biochemical weathering of mineral materials which are best
described in profile.

At the bottom of the profile lies the

bedrock from which the weathering action developed the soil.
The bedrock is called parent material. The area above the
parent material is known as regolith, and its depth and
characteristics are highly variable.

The upper three to six

feet of the regolith has been extensively weathered and has
some measure of organic matter, since this is the area where
plant roots are found. It is this upper biochemically
weathered zone of the regolith which is conventionally
identified as soil.
As indicated above, the upper layers of the soil
profile (or surface soil) contain the highest concentrations
of organic matter.

In fact, five to six percent of the

surface soil is organic matter.

This organic material is

vitally important in terms of soil productivity.

The

surface soil is the source of a large share of the water and
nutrients for plant growth and development.

It is also the

layer of soil most affected by the actions of man.

Han may

-5alter the organic content, tilth, fertility, cation exchange
capacity (CEC), pH and moisture level of the surface soil,
thereby directly affecting current and future soil
productivity.
Finally, note that mineral soils are comprised of the
following four elements:
water and air.

mineral materials, organic matter,

A silt loam surface soil in optimum

condition for plant growth contains about 50 percent pore
space (which is air and water); 45 percent mineral matter;
and 5 percent organic matter (Buckman and Brady 1969).
Altering this mix will change productivity.

Soil erosion

not only alters this mix, but has numerous other detrimental
effects, which are discussed in the next section.

1.1.2

Erosion
Soil erosion is the process of wearing away the land

surface by water, wind and other geological agents.

This

research will concentrate on the on-farm effects of
water-induced sheet and rill erosion.*

Soil erosion begins

when the explosive action of raindrops dislodge particles of
soil, along with nutrients and other solutes (such as
pesticides).

The resultant runoff is then transported to

some downslope location.

This action is repeated again and

again, gradually moving the soil and associated elements to
the bottom of the slope or to a water course where it is
ultimately delivered to lakes, reservoirs, estuaries,
harbors and the like.

The on-site effect of erosion is

-6dramatic.
For example, the eroded material from a
Collington loam in comparison with the original
soil contained, in total, 4.7 times as much
organic matter, 5.0 times as much nitrogen, 3.1
times as much phosphorous, and 1.4 times as much
potassium (Buckman and Brady 1969, p. 222).
In addition, the erosion process carries away commercial
fertilizers, thereby reducing their effectiveness and
increasing their application rate.
As indicated in the previous section, soil is created
through the interaction of parent material and biochemical
weathering.

This would indicate that soil is a renewable

resource and that under natural conditions, the soil and its
productivity would at least be held constant or increase
over time.

However, the rate at which soil is being

produced is difficult to quantify.

Soil scientists have

estimated that soil loss tolerances range from two to five
tons per acre per year.

These tolerable soil loss limits

were determined during five regional workshops during the
early 1960's but they have come under strong criticism due
to their ad hoc nature (Crosson 1983).

The overriding

consideration in setting socially desirable erosion rates (T
values) was long-term maintenance of adequate soil depth for
"good" plant growth. In essence, by bequeathing equal soil
depth across generations, social planners are implicitly
assuming an interest rate of 0 (i.e. l/(l+i)fc = 1, where i =
0).

If private rates of time preference are positive, then

clearly, even with the same soil depletion model, the

-7private and social rates of soil conservation will be
different.

In general, the deeper the surface soil the

higher

the T value.

In

addition it should benoted that T

values

are employed

by

conservation

plannersas goals and,

as such, current soil conservation policy in effect is
giving equal weight to current and future productivity.
To obtain a better understanding of the rate of soil
renewal, consider that if soil is produced at the rate of
three tons
pounds

per acre

per year, has a

dry bulkdensity of 80

par cubic foot, and there isno erosion, then each

year the depth of the soil will increase by .00172 foot.
Alternatively, it would take 581 years to produce a foot of
soil with no erosion.

With erosion at two tons per acre per

year (which is a very low erosion rate), it would take 1,743
years to produce a foot of soil.

When erosion rates exceed

the soil creation rate then clearly no soil is accumulated.
Since the natural erosion rates are generally slightly lower
than the rate of soil formation, it is apparent that
agriculturally productive soils are thousands of years old.
When agricultural activities result in erosion rates in
excess of the T value, the farmer is drawing not only from
the annual flow of soil productivity, but also extracting
from the stock of soil productivity.

-81.2

Potato Farming in Aroostook County

Aroostook County has historically been among the most
important potato producing areas in the nation.

In 1950,

Maine produced 22 percent of all fall potatoes grown in the
United States.

However, by the late 1970's Maine's share

had fallen to 9 percent

(USDA Crop Reporting Board).

This reduction in market share is attributed to
several factors.

While other regions experienced increased

yields per acre during the above period, Maine's yields
dropped.

In fact, Maine's recent yields have been less than

their 1960 yields (Putnam 1981).

Soil erosion, it can be

argued, has contributed to this decline.

In addition,

Putnam lists the following items which have contributed to
the decline of the Maine potato industry.

(1)

The growth

of the processed potato market in the 1960's benefited Idaho
for two reasons:

first, its production was dominated by the

Russet Burbank variety, which possesses important processing
characteristics; and second, Idaho had several World War II
vintage dried potato factories which were easily converted
to other processing techniques.

(2) Federal water storage

projects provided western potato growers with irrigation
opportunities.

(3) Western potato producers employed strict

inspection standards, through federal marketing orders, to
improve the quality of fresh market potatoes.

(4)

Other

regions developed improved packing and marketing techniques.
(5) Other producing areas built modern storage facilities

-9allowing them to take advantage of spring and summer markets
(which have higher prices).
Interestingly enough, Maine's 1980 cost of production
per acre is actually less than Idaho’s (i.e. $806 per acre
vs. $811 per acre), and only half that of Long Island's
production cost (Putnam 1981).

Thus, the income squeeze for

Maine derives not from costs, but from yields and prices.
Notably, it has the second lowest yield per acre of any
potato growing region.
Further compounding the potato growers' problem, Maine
potatoes sell at a discount.

For example, the 1979 New York

terminal market price for Idaho potatoes was $0,125 per
pound, while the Maine price was $0,066 per pound
Crop Reporting Board).

(USDA

Although the transportation costs

for Idaho potatoes are substantially higher, the fact that
the market supports a higher price for Idaho potatoes
indicates that potatoes from Maine are not perceived as good
substitutes.
The manner in which Maine potatoes are marketed also
negatively impacts the Maine potato industry.

Currently

there are about 1,000 potato farms in Aroostook County (USDA
Ag. Census 1978).

During the 1970's, about 57 percent of

the tablestock was marketed by individual farmers.

In 1976

there were about 800 different packing lines operating in
Aroostook County (Putnam 1981).
quality.

This had adverse effects on

This unique feature of the Aroostook marketing

system depends on the existence of marketing intermediaries

-10(broker/dealers) which buy from farmers and then sell to
processors and terminal markets.

During the 1978-1979

season 135 licensed brokers operated in Aroostook County.
Federal marketing orders have not been used in Maine
since 1963.

In 1979 a marketing order for Russet tablestock

was introduced but it does not include mandatory inspection.
Other growing areas

usethe marketing orders to improve the

quality of marketed

potatoes (Putnam 1981) .

In short, the Maine potato industry is beset with a
number of problems which directly and indirectly influence
soil use rates.

It

rates reduce yields
squeeze.

hasbeensuggested that high erosion
and

thuscompound

the net income

Furthermore, a host of exogenous variables

interact with soil use decision rules, confounding efforts
to reduce soil use rates.

1.3

1.3.1

Plan of Work

Problem
As indicated earlier, water-induced soil erosion is

depleting the soil resource not only in Aroostook County,
but also in the entire United States.

In fact, on cropland

with moderate slopes, more than one-half of the top soil has
been lost through erosion (Sommers 1979) .

Another source

indicates that during the past 200 years, at least one-third
of the top soil on cropland has been lost (Pimentel 1976).
And yet another claim is that during the past 200 years the

-11average depth of top soil on cropland has declined from
three feet to six inches (Jeffords 1979). This degrading of
the quality (through loss of nutrients, tilth, water-holding
capacity and other production related characteristics) and
quantity of the soil resource has been largely masked since
World War II by technological changes. Genetic improvements
in crop varieties, the introduction of chemical fertilizers
and pesticides, and the development of more efficient
machinery have led technological improvements that increased
agricultural production fifty percent from 1949 to 1969.
During this same period, 58 million acres were set aside
under federal land bank programs and an additional 45
million acres of cropland were lost to urban and related
land uses (Pimentel 1976). John F. Timmons summarizes the
problem:
In the 1950's
inherent soil
technological
leveled off.
coming along.

technology substituted for
productivity. Now the
develop- ments seem to have
There are no break- throughs
(Risser 1978, p. 10)

Unfortunately there is no single substitute for the soil
resource which simultaneously provides all the required
characteristics (i.e., nutrients, water, and structural
support).
In addition, the general economy and the federal
government send constantly changing signals to farmers.
These signals, in the form of prices, interest rates,
conservation compliance (i.e., a requirement that farmers
protect highly erodible land or lose all federal farm

-12benefits) , and many other factors directly and indirectly
influence the farmer's conservation decisions. These factors
increase the tension between the social and the private
conservation levels.

In short, the erosion problem can be

expressed as a divergence between the private and social
(defined as T) optimum soil use rates.

The divergence may

be due to poor information; differences between the social
and private discount rates; or imperfect future land
markets.

In order to better understand this problem, and to

examine several relationships maintained in the literature,
this dissertation will derive, estimate and analyze the time
invariant soil management decision rule. Before the decision
rule is derived, the literature of soil conservation will be
reviewed in this section.

The following section discusses

the contribution of this dissertation.

Finally, at the end

of this chapter, an overview of the remainder of the
dissertation is presented.

1.3.2

Past Research
Research in the area of soil conservation can be

divided into four broad categories:

agronomic,

sociological, economic and policy related.

This section

begins with a cursory overview of the agronomic studies,
followed by a limited discussion of the sociological
research.

Thereafter a more detailed review of the economic

literature is provided.

This section concludes with a note

on positions held in policy articles.

-13-

1.3.2.1

Agronomic.

In summary, the branch of agronomy

interested in the effects of erosion seeks to estimate the
relationship between soil depth {erosion over time) and crop
yields. By in large, studies in this area have indicated
that as soil depth declines, yields fall. The actual
functional relationship varies by crop and soil type.

For

an excellent summary of recent work in this area see Crosson
and Stout (1983, Chapter 5), or The Proceedings of the
National Symposium on Erosion and Soil Productivity
(American Society of Agricultural Engineers 1985).

In

addition, the American Society of Agronomy and the Soil
Science Society of America (1982) provide a discussion on
how to establish tolerable soil loss limits for various
soils.
A typical example of work in this area can be found in
Langdale, et al. (1979) where field plot data are used to
estimate the yield-soil depth relationship.

They found that

the loss of 15 centimeters of soil resulted in corn yields
declining by 40 percent.

However, this drop in yields has

not been observed in annual crop statistics because of the
masking effect of technological advances. They estimate that
technological change has increased corn yields 100 percent
on moderately eroded land during the past 40 years.
Unfortunately similar information is not available
concerning potato yields.
Pierce, et al.

(1983) discuss the development of a

-14soil productivity simulation model which predicts yields
based on soil bulk density, pH, and available water
capacity.

The underlying concept in their model is that

over time erosion affects the rooting depth, available water
capacity, soil nutrient levels, organic content, and surface
run-off, which causes reduced crop yields.

The Pierce model

has been used by the Soil Conservation Service to estimate
long term erosion control benefits in PL-566 watershed
protection projects.

1.3.2.2

Sociological.

A number of articles in the

rural sociology literature have addressed the issue of soil
conservation.

In general they focus on why farmers adopt

conservation practices and include demographic variables as
well as perceptions (e.g. conservation ethic) and
institutional factors in their analysis.

See Lee (1980),

and Lovejoy and Napier (1986) .
Ervin and Ervin (1982) model the conservation
practice decisionmaking process and conclude that there is
a "weak" link between government programs and conservation.
Unfortunately the empirical results of their static model
and poor data have limited the statistical significance of
their findings.

As such, they suggest that future research

should employ a dynamic approach.

They indicate that debt

is "popularly perceived" as an important variable in
conservation decisions.

More specifically, high debt

implies that farmers cannot afford to invest in

1
j
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They also suggest that age and education are

positively correlated with conservation.
Napier, et al. (1984) found that the adoption of
conservation practices could not be explained by
demographic variables and that the best predictors of
adoption were economic factors such as farm size and other
scale variables.

They suggest that the adoption of

conservation practices could be better understood from the
perspective of risk involved (i.e. the risk involved in
trying a new management regime).

1.3.2.3

Economics.

The earliest work involving an

economic analysis of soil erosion was done just before World
War II.

Articles by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1938a, 1938b), and

Ibach (1940) all addressed the depletion of the soil
resource.

They recognized that excessive use was causing a

reduction in soil productivity and that intergenerational
effects were occurring.

The timing of this interest in soil

clearly is related to the dust bowl of the 1930's.

These

writers owe an intellectual debt to Gray (1913) and
Hotelling (1936).
The growth of environmental concerns in the late
1960's and early 1970's renewed interest in the study of
soil use rates.

These studies usually employed a linear

programming model to estimate the effects of imposing
non-point source pollution or erosion regulations on the
agricultural sector. In summary, the studies indicated that
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water quality with a comparatively small impact on total
farm income, with the qualification that there could be
significant redistribution of income to those areas with
low erosion potential.

The Wade and Heady (1977) analysis

is more or less typical of the linear programming efforts.
Their study evaluated a modeling scheme designed to link
the demand for agricultural commodities to generation of
cropland sediment.

They were concerned with the

adjustments in the agricultural production system induced
by water quality motivated sediment goals.

The model

employed in analyzing national and interregional impacts
included production costs, commodity demands and sediment
production and delivery.

The production and transportation

system models were based on 105 production areas in the
United States.

As in other studies, the Universal Soil

Loss Equation (USLE) was employed to estimate soil erosion.
Commodities demanded are based on year 2000 estimates of
population. The model assumed that labor and capital are
completely mobile between the present and the year 2000.
The authors stressed that this was a policy model, not a
predictive or forecast model.

Five national sediment

control policies were evaluated:
alternative;

(1) an unrestricted

(2) an alternative which minimized the total

national sediment load and total production cost; (3) an
alternative which limited erosion to the rate at which soil
is produced;

(4) an alternative which limited sediment
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measured at the producing area; and (5) an alternative
which limited sediment loads at the mouth of river basins
to 80 percent of the unrestricted alternatives.
For the minimum sediment alternative, total sediment
delivered to national borders was reduced by 23.3 percent, as
compared to the unrestricted alternative.
cropland was reduced 90 percent.

Sediment from

However, due to the large

share of sediment from non-cropland sources, the overall
effect was diminished.

The tolerable soil loss limit

alternative showed dramatic effects in the Midwest and
Southeast, reducing sediment significantly, while parts of
the West showed increased sediment loads due to cropping
adjustments necessitated by commodity demands.

With the

soil loss tolerance (T) limit alternative, the results were
higher food costs to consumers and higher environmental
budget costs.

The authors were reluctant to select a best

alternative; however, the tolerable erosion loss limit
alternative:
...places controls at the farm level and
increases the average and marginal costs of
commodities produced. It also results in a
substantial reduction in total sediment load.
Regional erosion differences are recognized by
this type of control and economic advantages
change accordingly.
If a higher level of
sediment control is desired, this type of policy
might prove difficult to administer.
(p. 24)
Similar noteworthy studies have been conducted by Forster
and Becker (1979); Osteen and Seitz (1978); and Taylor and
Frohberg (1977) .
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have measurably advanced the study of the soil resource.
Burt used adynamic

optimization model of thefollowing form:

MAXj; t = 1 ( # (G|ut , xt ,
where

yt ) / (1 + r)*)

(1.2)

x is depth of topsoil (inches)
y is percentage of soil organic matter
u is percentage of land in wheat
r is discount rate (real)
® is infinity
G(') is an annual net returns function.
Equation (1.2) was maximized subject to the following

constraints:
x t+i

= x t - Q ( u t > x t , yt>

yt+l = Yt " H(ut ,xt , yt)

<I *3 >

(1.4)

Where Q (•) is an annual soil loss function and H {-) is an
annual organic matter loss function.
Burt found that intensive crop production (wheat) in
conjunction with heavy fertilization is the most profitable
system in both the short and long run (except for very low
commodity prices).

In addition, his model agreed with the

conventional wisdom that relatively high grain prices
exacerbate erosion.
McConnell provided a particularly elegant model of the
soil resource.

He proposed that farmers maximize the net

value of the farm:
MAX

N =

/oT

Ce“rt[pg(t) f(s,x,z)

- cz]dt + R[x(t)]e~rt)

(1.5)

-19Subject to:

dx/dt = k - s
x(0) = x0

and
where

r is the farmer's discount rate
t is time
p is per unit output price
g(t) is neutral technical change
f(*) is the production function
s is soil loss
x is soil depth
z is an index of variable inputs
c is input price index
R (•) is farm resale value function
k is an exogenous addition to the soil.

In this case, the farmer is maximizing the present value of
net returns plus the resale value of his farm.

The resale

value is a function of soil depth.
The undiscounted Hamiltonian associated with the above
optimal control problem is:
H = [pgf(s,x,z) - cz] + L(k-s)

(1 .6 )

From the maximum principle, the optimal paths of z, s, x and
satisfy the following conditions:
dH(z,s,x,L)/ds = pgfc (s,x,z) - L = 0

(1-7)

dH(z,s,x,L)/dz = pgfz (s,x,z) - c = 0

(1 .8 )

L = rL = dH/dx = L - pgfx (s,x,z)

(1.9)

dx/dt = k - s

(I.10)

x (0) = x 0

(I.11)

L(T) = dR[x(T) ]/dx(T)

(1.12)
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conditions.

For example, equation (1.7) requires that the

value of the marginal product of soil is equal to its
implicit cost, L.
McConnell then assumed the second derivatives of f(*)
with respect to s and z are less than or equal to zero, for
fixed values of x, and then solved for ds/dt:

(where x

indicates the time partial derivative of a given variable)
® = fssfstr - P/P - 9/g - fx/f8 - (k-s)(fxs/fs)]
+ fszfx [6/c - p/p “ g/g " (k-s)(f2X/fz]

(1.13)

The implications are that higher future prices, lower
discount rates and movement up the marginal product curve
will lower current soil loss.

One of McConnell's conclusions

is that rational profit maximizing farmers, even with full
knowledge of soil productivity relationships, can and will
deplete the soil resource.

As such, public policy should be

concerned with reducing erosion only where it leads to
significant externalities.
Kiker and Lynne (1986), commenting on McConnell's
paper, argued in part that because McConnell's model of
conservation is a function of market signals, it may not
reflect long-term societal interests.

Their reasoning is

that:
As production plans are made for the first year, a
farmer will have some expectation of the prices and
land values for that year and possibly for the next
few years. But for each succeeding year, the
variance of any subjective estimate would be
increasing at an increasing rate.
(p. 739)

-21It is this expanding uncertainty which makes it impossible to
develop a soil conservation plan that is optimal for even the
intermediate term.
McConnell (1986) countered that the profession does not
know how uncertainty affects the social optimality of private
decisions.

Furthermore, he argued that in the absence of

more knowledge of productivity relationships and expected
prices, "...we are not badly off by trusting our resources
with those that must make a living from them."

(p. 743)

Bhide, Pope and Heady (1982) not only derived a general
optimal control solution, they also provided numerical
solutions.

Although their model is not stochastic, it does

show that it is possible to lower the trajectory of soil use
rates without reducing associated net returns in certain
areas.

They modeled a variety of discount rates, time

horizons, levels of technological growth, functional
relationships between soil depth and changes in net returns,
and three policy objectives.
Clark and Furtan (1983) used a qualitative approach to
evaluate soil depletion which requires that soil be defined
in terms of a composite of several factors.
they selected two factors:
precipitation.

For simplicity

total nitrogen content and total

Neo-classical capital theory is used to

describe behavior.

The results of this study are at odds

with those of other studies.

For example, lowering the

social discount rate increases depletion rates and altering
the interest rate has no affect on erosion rates.

In

-22addition, because they confined their model to two proxies
for state and control variables, they cannot account for
interaction between soil and other variables.
Collins and Headley (1983) also investigated soil
erosion from the perspective of capital theory.

They noted

that soil conservation investments are somewhat unique
insomuch as they do not create new income streams, but alter
existing income streams.

Their results suggest that the

optimal decay rate of income, because of soil erosion, is
dependent upon current farm income, the interest rate, and
cost effectiveness of conservation practices.

Furthermore,

government subsidies do alter rational farmer behavior.
Finally, although not explicitly concerned with the
soil resource, Eckstein (1984) recently offered a rational
expectations model of the allocation of land in Egypt.

He

develops a stochastic optimization model where a farmer must
allocate an endowment of land between two crops.

One crop,

cotton, depletes soil productivity (nitrogen in Eckstein's
model) more rapidly than the other crop, wheat.

Eckstein's

model also incorporates rational expectations and costs of
adjustment.
The farmer's objective is to maximize,
E_x lim

E t= 0 ,N£Bt (Xlt + (P2t/Plt>X2t n

(1.14)

subject to a land constraint,
^lt + A 2t = A

(1*15)

Where E_^ is the mathematical expectation operator (last
period's expectation of this period’s

-23discounted income)
B

is the discount rate

Xlt is the production of crop 1 at time t (cotton)
X2t is the production of crop 2 at time t (wheat)
Plt is the price of cotton
P2t is the price of wheat
A lt is land allocated at time t-1 for cotton
production
A2 t
A

*

land allocated at time t-1 for wheat production
is total land

The information set that the land allocation decision
is based upon is:
It_i = £Alt-l'A lt-2*••*' alt-l'a2t-l'•* *'
(P2t-t/plt-l)'(p2t-2/plt-2>'* ••'
1 r®t— 2 » • * • J

(1.16)

In

this case, a^t is a shock to production of crop i at

t,

and S is a vector of exogenousfactors that affect

time

prices.
The production

function for cotton can be written as:

Xlt = <fl + alt “ (9i/2)Ait)A it + d i U _ <A it-l^A

- Ait/A* ^ Ait
where f^, gj and

(1.17)
are positive scalars.

The first term

is a quadratic production function and the second term
incorporates the notion of land depreciation caused by the
production of cotton.

Note that the greater the proportion

of land allocated to cotton, past and present, the lower the
production of cotton.

If half the land has been and is

-24allocated to cotton, then the second term is zero.
The optimal decision rule derived by Eckstein is:
Alt = PlAlt-l + I(PiA*/di(l - Pi)) (mean of R) ]
where

(1.18)

is the root of an expectational difference equation and

R is the real shadow price for crop 1 land allocations.
Maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate the
model.

The estimated value of p^, was found to be .081 and

d^ was -.008.

If R is 16.8 and A* is 1,000, then

Alt = .OBlA^.j - 185.092
In estimating the model two identifying restrictions
were employed:

(1) the assumption that A^t does not Granger

cause R^.; and (2) the cross equation restrictions derived
from the rational expectations assumption.

unfortunately the

model is rejected because the first assumption is violated:
the shadow price is not exogenous.
In summary, over time the economic analysis of the
soil resource has become more and more sophisticated.

Yet

no single model offers a comprehensive dynamic stochastic
analysis of the soil resource in a framework where
expectations are optimal and structural equations are
estimated.

I.3.2.4

Policy.

Finally, a brief summary of articles

that are less technical and more policy related will help
outline some of the current thinking surrounding soil
conservation.

See Bradlee (1983), USDA (1982), Pavelis

(1983), GAO (1983) , and Reichelderfer (1985) for examples of

-25work in this area.

A commonly-held position is that the

public's perception of soil conservation is that most farmers
cannot afford to adopt conservation practices and that soil
conservation is one of the areas where the market system
fails - hence it is a classic case where government
intervention is warranted.

Furthermore there is a growing

concern that other government policies aggravate the soil
conservation problem.

In fact, Osteen (1985) suggested that

there is a link between erosion rates and agricultural policy
inherent in export programs, price support programs, and
production control programs.

Moreover he indicated that

price stabilization policies reduce the need to diversify
(rotate crops).
Perhaps the key point in the above articles is that
farmers' make conservation decisions in an environment which
may provide incentive for farmers to deviate from the
socially optimal erosion rate.

Moreover, the affects of

policies directed at another problem (e.g. farm income and
price supports) cannot be ignored.

1.3.3

Objectives
The objective of this study is to better understand

how farmers make soil conservation decisions.

The decision

to adopt conservation practices to control erosion is a
complex process which involves a number of economic and
noneconomic variables.

Among these variables are various

government policies and the farmer's expectations about

-26yields, prices and income.

In addition, it is a process

that lends itself to assuming that the farmer is a profit
maximizer.

In maximizing profits, the farmer makes choices

(e.g. how much to plant of each crop, which is argued later
is a good proxy for soil management) while facing certain
constraints (e.g. technology, the state of the soil
resource, etc.).

In short, the conservation decision

lends itself to mathematical optimization techniques.
This simple optimization problem is made somewhat more
complex because farmers make current decisions based upon
their future expectations (supply response models).

Once it

is recognized that expectations are critical in a supply
response model the next step is to model how expectations
are formed.

In the past, expectation formation was modeled

as adaptive or backward-looking (Nerlove 1958).

Rational

expectations, on the other hand, takes the view that people
are forward-looking and incorporate information optimally in
forming expectations. Eckstein (1985) used a linear
quadratic model of agricultural supply to show how rational
expectations models are as good as Nerlovian supply response
models at fitting the data. Previous work has assumed that
cyclical aspects of the cobweb model are derived from
incorrect price forecasts.

Eckstein demonstrated that a

dynamic model with rational farmers can explain the cobweb
behavior without resorting to assuming that farmers make
persistent errors.

Furthermore, he discussed how the

rational expectations and Nerlovian supply response models

-27are observationally equivalent.

That is, they may have the

same reduced form, but the interpretation of the parameters
is different.

The use of such models has profound

consequences for the construction of policy analysis models
because no longer is it implicitly assumed that an
individual's behavior does not depend upon changes in policy
variables.
Based on the above, this research will develop dynamic
nonlinear (quadratic) objective function models that have
decision rules which are functions of invariant structural
parameters (including the coefficients of the optimal
expectations equation).

Furthermore, uncertainty will be

modeled with assumptions about random shocks to variables.
Specifically a model of the Aroostook County potato
production will be developed.

The model will include a

conservation adoption function which will depend upon
variables in other equations within the model, and upon
events outside the model.

With this arrangement it will be

possible to observe how variables in the optimal decision
rule affect the adoption of conservation practices, all
within the overriding farm level profit maximizing
framework.
(1)

In summary, the objectives of this study are:
Analyze the nature of the time invariant soil
use decision rule;

(2)

Develop a rational expectations estimation
technique using commonly-used techniques; and

-28(3)

Quantitatively examine hypotheses maintained
in the literature.

1.3.4

Outline
Chapter II discusses rational expectations in general

and develops a model of potato production.

Chapter III

outlines the econometric estimation strategy and defines the
data, while Chapter IV presents the results of the
estimation process.

Chapter V analyzes the estimated model,

and Chapter VI draws conclusions and suggests future
research.

CHAPTER II

A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF POTATO PRODUCTION

In this chapter a rational expectations model of the
soil resource of Aroostook County is developed.

A

discussion of rational expectations is followed by a
demonstration of the Lucas Critique.

Finally, after a brief

discussion of resource economics, the multi-equation model
to be estimated is described in detail.

II.l

Rational Expectations

The literature concerning rational expectations is
growing rapidly.

During the 1970's, it was applied

primarily to macroeconomic problems, and rational
expectations is fundamentally associated with the work of
Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent.

Application to

microeconomic problems is expanding.

The basic reference is

Muth (1961), who applied rational expectations to an
agricultural market.

The following is a summary of

expectations theory.
Based upon the Cagan (1956) work on hyperinflation,
Nerlove (1958) applied the concept of adaptive expectations
to agriculture.

Nerlove's model was comprised of three

-30equations (with time subscripts suppressed):
°Qt = a - bPt

(II.l)

SQt = c + dPet

(II.2)

Pet = Pt_!e + A(Pt_1

-

0

<A < 1

(II.3)

where DQt is the quantitydemanded, Pt is

the equilibrium
O
price and b is the slope of the demand curve; Qt is the
quantity supplied, Pe^. is the adaptively expected price, and

d is the slope of the supply curve; and A is the rate of
adjustment of P

*

to new information.

When A = 1, we have

the original Ezekiel (1938) formulation.
The first-order difference equation of the adaptive
model solved for the equilibrium path of price is;
Pt = (a - c)/ (d + b) + I(-d/b - 1)A
+ l]fc[P0 - (a-c/b+d)]

(II.4)

where PQ is the original price and (a-c/b+d) is the
equilibrium price.
Stability requires that;
|[(-d/b - 1)A+1J| < 1

(II.5)

Note that the coefficient of adaptation acts as a "brake";
no matter what the slopes of supply and demand, one can
specify an A that will result in stability.
Nerlove's work was profound:

The impact of

Askari and Cummings (1977)

list over 500 agricultural studies based on Nerlove's work.
Rational expectations models for the agricultural
sector can be divided into two groups:
and those without storage.
richer,

those with storage

Although theinventorymodel is

the no-storage model will be discussed here

because

-31of its simplicity, its compatibility with the above adaptive
model and because it is compatible with potato production
where storage from one period to another is not practical
year to year.

Storage is not practical because there are no

controlled storage facilities in Aroostook County.
Utilizing an agricultural example, Muth (1961) was
concerned with the dynamic process of economics.

He

recognized that the way expectations are formed will affect
the time path of variables.

Furthermore, he noted that:

(1) averages of expectations in an industry were better
predictors than naive models and as reliable as elaborate
equation systems, even with wide cross sectional
differences? and

(2) reported model expectations generally

understated the magnitude of the actual changes.
Muth responds to these observations with:
In order to explain these phenomena, I should
like to suggest that expectations, since they
are informed predictions of future events, are
essentially the same as the predictions of the
relevant economic theory. At the risk of
confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis
with a pronouncement as to what firms ought to
do, we call such expectations "rational"....
Our hypothesis is based on ... the ... point
of view that economic models do not assume
enough rationality.
(p. 316)
In other words, the:
...expectations of firms (or more generally,
the subjective probability distribution of
outcomes) tends to be distributed, for the same
information set about the prediction of the
theory (or the objective probability
distribution of outcome). (p. 316)

-32More formally, this can be expressed as:
t_!Pet = E[Pt |It_!] + et

(II.6)

where t_^Pet is the expected price in period t, It-i is the
information set available in period t-1, and et is a
forecast error.
Equation (II.6) states that the expected price is
equal to the conditional expectation of Pt given the
information set

Note that the expected value of the

error term is zero and the error term is orthogonal
(uncorrelated) to (with) any information available to
economic agents.

If this was not true, forecasts could be

improved by taking into account this correlation. Overall,
expectations will diverge from the actual value only when
uncertainty is present.
Although the application of rational expectations to
macroeconomics is relatively new, the reapplication to
agricultural models is even more recent.

One of the first

articles is the work by Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982)
regarding the broiler market.

Their rational expectations

model passed the likelihood ratio prediction test, and the
additional information test (future markets).

Their

conclusion was that rational expectations would be
appropriately applied in other agricultural markets.

In

addition, Cooley and DeCanio (1977) have done a broad
historical analysis of rational expectations in American
agriculture.

Their results also support the rational

expectations hypothesis.
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rational expectations model is developed for the
agricultural sector.

Under this model, the individual

farmer asks:
What price should I expect next year taking into
account the supply decisions of similarly
situated producers so that my expectations for
prices will, on average, be correct?
(Sheffrin
1983, p. 157)
Assume a market model where:
(II.7)
(II-8)
(II.9)
where Y is income and w is the weather.
Equating equations (II.7) and (II.8) and taking the
conditional expectations, obtains:
(11.10)

Pet = (dYet - fwet)/(c + b)
where Ye^ and we^ are expected income and weather

Clearly

the expected price reduced form equation is driven by the
expected values of the exogenous variables.

Without the

expectation of the exogenous variables the solution and
estimation is straight forward.

However, recognizing that

the above is really an expectational difference equation
alters the solution and estimation process.

Fortunately,

recent techniques developed by Whiteman (1983 and 1985) make
it possible to mathematically determine the functional form
of the above, while analytically determining the existence
and uniqueness of rational expectations equilibria.
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The Lucas Critique

Although the thrust of this research is not policy
oriented, it is worth noting that the Lucas Critique (Lucas
1976) materially altered the way policy models should be
constructed.

The essence of the Lucas Critique is that an

individual's behavior is not invariant to changes in the
environment within which decisions are made.

In other

words, if a policy instrument is altered, one cannot assume
that reduced form coefficients associated with individual
behavior will remain unchanged.

This has econometric

implications which can be illustrated with a simple example.
Assume there are stochastic supply and demand
equations given as:
D°t = D 0 + DiPt + D2Yt + elt

(11.11)

S°t = S 0 + Slt_1Pet + S2Gt + e 2fc

(11.12)

where DQfc j_s the quantity demanded in time t and SQt is the
quantity supplied in time t.
parameters.

The D's and S's are behavioral

Pfc j.s the price of the good in time t and

t_iP6t is last period's expected period t price.

Yt is a

shift variable (such as income), G fc is a policy variable,
and elt and e2t are serially uncorrelated zero mean
residuals.
and Yfc an<j

Qt and Pt are endogenously determined variables,
are exogenous.

The equilibrium condition is:
DQt - S°t

(11.13)

Substituting equations (11.11) and (11.12) into (11.13),
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D0 + &lpt + D2Yt + e lt

=

S0 + slt-lpet + s2Gt + e2t

(11.14)

Taking the conditional mathematical expectation of (11.14)
yields:
D0 + Dlt.1Pet +

=

S0 + Slt-lp6t + S2t-lG0t

(11.15)

Solving equation (11.15) for t_iPet results in:
t-lp 6 t =

where

<S 0-D 0 + S 2 t - l Y V

D 2t-lG e t ) (D1 - S 1 )" 1

(II*16)

t_!Get = E[Gt |lt_1], for example.

(11.17)

Conventional policy analysis would take the reduced
form (equation 11.16) and alter the policy variable Gfc and
estimate the effect on P^.

But note this implicitly assumes

that the behavioral parameters, D2 for example, are
invariant to the policy regime.

However, the core of the

Lucas Critique is that changes in the environment in which
individuals make decisions (i.e. changes in the information
set) influence behavior.
can solve this problem.

Rational expectations technique
It is necessary that the stochastic

processes driving the exogenous variables be identified, and
that the structural parameters be estimated.

This has been

accomplished in a general sense by equation (11.17). Note
that the relationship between the parameters in equation
(11.16) and coefficients of the stochastic process that
defines Gfc form what has been termed the hallmark of
rational expectations - the cross equation restrictions.
In estimating rational expectations models, the key is

-36to make certain that all the structural parameters are
identified.

This is critical because it can be assumed over

relevant ranges that the structural parameters are invariant
to policy changes.

Therefore, if the parameters of expected

government policy are estimated (equation 11.17) and
substituted into equation (11.16), it is possible to satisfy
the Lucas Critique.

Then, as variables are altered in the

information set, it is possible to observe any changes in
the S2 behavioral parameter and also in the equilibrium
level.

This then suggests that rational expectations models

may alter the equilibrium dynamics as well as the
equilibrium.

As such there may be a change in the slope as

well as an initial jump to a new equilibrium path.

II.3

Principles of Exhaustible Resource Economics

Before proceeding with the development of our model, a
discussion of basic resource economic principles is
necessary.

A number of excellent sources are available

which summarize resource economics.

See Fisher (1981),

Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Dasgupta (1982), and Herfindahl
and Kneese (1974).
As Fisher (1981) points out, the primary difference
between exhaustible resources and other resources is that
the former are not producible.

As such, today's use of an

exhaustible resource affects production in future periods.
The effect on future periods can be viewed as an opportunity

-37cost (i.e. what could have been produced in the future had
we not used a unit of the resource today).
These interperiod or dynamic effects alter the normal
efficiency criteria from:
Price = Marginal Cost
to:
Price = Marginal Cost + Future Opportunity Cost
The above condition can be viewed as the first
condition of optimal depletion and in general it requires
that so long as there are future opportunity costs induced
by current use, the price of the resource will be higher
than under the producible factor case, and thus the quantity
used will be lower.
The second condition for optimal depletion is that the
present value of the opportunity cost (sometimes referred to
as the user cost, royalty or marginal profit) is the same in
all periods.

If this condition did not hold, then a

modification in resource use rates could exploit the
difference in the present value of user cost and increase
total profits.
In the case of the soil resource, high erosion rates in
the current period will lower production in future periods.
The standard textbook example of an exhaustible resource
involves a resource (such as oil) which has a set price.
However, the decision process associated with the soil
resource is somewhat less straight forward than the oil model
because the choice variable is not soil but rather the

-38cultural practice selected by the farmer.

The following

sections describe in detail the model of the soil resource
use.

11.4

II.4.1

Model Development

Introduction
The model formulated below falls in the general class

of what Chow terms "Models of Optimizing Agents" (Chow
1983).

Such models are largely based on the pioneering

work of Lucas and Sargent (1981), which derives from
engineering control literature (Anderson and Moore 1971,
Kwakernaak and Sivan 1972) .

These models can be

characterized by the following stochastic optimal linear
state feedback control system.
First it is assumed that economic agents face an
environment which can be described by a linear system of
equations, including stochastic disturbances,

Next it is

assumed that the objective function can be approximated by a
quadratic form.

Specifically, the economic agents will work

within the constraints of a linear production function and a
quadratic cost equation.

By maximizing profit (the objective

function) subject to the linear and stochastic environment,
we are able to obtain optimal decision rules where the choice
variables are linear functions of predetermined variables.
Key references concerning the modeling of stochastic
dynamic optimization systems are Lucas and Sargent

-39"Introduction" (1981); Hansen and Sargent (1981); Chow
(1981); Chow (1983); Whiteman (1983); Rosenman (1986);
Rosenman and Whiteman (1985); and Sargent (1979).

Perhaps

the most profound contribution of modeling optimizing
behavior is that it explicitly forces the analyst to
simultaneously consider the theoretical, policy,
mathematical and econometric aspects of a problem.
As the first step, the model will be formulated in
matrix notation, then the explicit functional form of each
equation will be discussed in detail.

In the matrix

formulation, the following notation and variables will be
used.
B

is the farmer's discount rate
is output at time t
is a pxl vector of state variables

Nfc is a qxl vector of control variables
Ct is cost at time t
Jt is profits at time t
E

is the expectations operator
is the price of output

wt is a qxl input price vector
The environment in which decisions are made is represented by
linear equations of motion (transition equations) which
describe how the exogenous state variables evolve over time.
Mt+1 = GMt + HNt

(11.18)

where G is a pxp matrix of coefficients and H is a pxq
matrix of coefficients.

The linear-quadratic model requires

-40that the transition equations be expressed as linear
functions.

Farm production, Y^f is also expressed as a

linear functions
= a'Mt + b'Nt + e'Mt.! + f'Nt.!

(11.19)

where a and e are pxl and b and f are qxl coefficient
vectors.

The cost function contains quadratic components

which in effect produce a concave profit function.

The cost

function is given by:
Ct = w ’ZNt + M'UMt + Nt 'VNt_1

(11.20)

where w is a qxl vector of input prices and z, U, and V are
qxq, pxp and qxq matrices of implicit cost coefficients.
It is assumed that the farmer's objective is to
maximize expected discounted profits over an infinite time
horizon.

Profits are defined as:
Jt = Pt+l<*t " Ct>

(11.21)

hence the farmer's objective is given as:
Max E Q i BtJt
where

(11.22)

Eg is defined as the time 0 expectation conditional on

the information set available at time 0 (i.e.
The optimal decision rules for the choice variables can
now be derived by maximizing (11.22) subject to the
constraints implicit in equations (11.18),
(11.20).

(11.19) and

The input demand equations are found by rearranging

the first order necessary conditions of the above
maximization problem.
The following expresses equation (11.22) with (11.19)
and (11.20) substituted for Yfc and C f

-41J = E0 Bt [Pt+1(a'Mt + b'Nt + e 'Mt-1 + f'Nt.i)
- W'ZNt - Mt ’UMt - Nt'VNt.i]

(11.23)

Taking the partial of J with respect to the choice variables
yields:
(dJ/dNt) = B°EtPt+1b - B°ZWt - B°VNt_1 + BEtPt+2Ha
+ BEtPt+2f - BZH'GUMt - B H 'UHNfc - B2VENfc+1 = 0

(11.24)

Collecting the choice variable terms gives:
B0vNt_i + BH'UHNt + B2VEtNt+1
= B°EtPt+1b - B°ZWt + BEtPt+2H'e + BEtPfc+2f - BZHGUMt (11.25)
The factor demand equations are obtained by rearranging and
lagging (11.25):
Nt = [2V]"1-H'UHNt_1 - B_1VNt_2 - ZII'GUM*..!
- B-1ZWt_1 + EtPt+1(H’e + f) + B-1Ptb

(11.26)

The first three terms on the right-hand side represent the
user costs imposed on profit by past use rates; the fourth
term is marginal cost; the fifth term is the expected
marginal revenue; and the final term is lagged marginal
revenue.
Next, using the following definitions, the specific
form of each of the model's equations are discussed.
= Profit
Pt = Price of potatoes (per cwt)
= Yield per total acreage farmed (in cwt/ac)
= Weather
CP£ = Crop rotation [ac oats/(ac potatoes
+ ac oats)]
xt = Index of purchased inputs (per ac)

1
-42SDt = Soil depth
Dt = Farm debt (per ac)
G t = Government expenditures for financial
assistance (per ac)
= Index of prices paid
K = Optimal Dfc/sDt ratio
E 0 = Time zero expectations operator
B = Discount rate (l+i)-t where i is the rate of time
preference

11.4.2

Transition Equation
Again, the first step in building the model is to

describe the environment in which economic agents make
decisions.

The evolution of the state variables is governed

by the following relationships:
SDt+l =

a0 +

(11.27)

+ a 2 CP^ +

pt+l =

1

i=0,NfPipt-i + ePt

(11.28)

Gt +1 =

E i=0,NfGiGt-i + eGt

(11.29)

Rt + 1 =

E i=0,NfRiRt-i + eRt

(11.30)

wt+l =

E i=0,NfWiwt-i + ewt

(11.31)

(11.32)
Dt + 1 = I i=0,NfDiDt-i + eDt
The soil depth transition equation is central to this
model.

Its form, linear in the parameters, is derived from

the requirements of a linear quadratic model. It is
hypothesized that purchased inputs (e.g. fertilizer) can
replenish soil productivity (recall Timmons).

Note from the

literature on soil productivity that soil depth is a good

1
-43proxy for soil productivity.

In addition, equation (11.27)

allows prior soil depth, previous soil management and
government cost sharing to influence next period's soil
depth.

Finally, an exogenous shock such as a critically

timed thunderstorm is allowed to affect soil depth.

The

evolution of the remaining exogenous variables take an
autoregressive form.
Based on the literature, it is expected (and will be
tested) that a£, a^ and a^ are greater than zero and that if
other inputs (X) can replenish soil productivity, then
will also be positive.

II.4.3

Production Function
The production function for potatoes in Aroostook

County is made linear in the parameters and is represented
by a first order Taylor series expansion. Although the
underlying production function may be nonlinear in the
parameters, it is assumed that over the relevant range of
data the linear approximation is appropriate.

The

production function is given by:
^t

=

®0

+ ®l^t + s 2 ^t— 1 + ®3C?t + s4^**t-l + s 5 SD^
+ s6 wfc + s7 W t _ 1 + S g Y ^

(11.24)

Yield, Yt , is measured as the average potato yield across all
cultivated acreage (i.e., the sum of potato and oat acreage).
The crop rotation or soil management variable,

allows

last year's rotation to influence this year's yield, thereby
introducing a dynamic element directly into the production

-44function.

The rationale for including last period's rotation

is based on the work by Hepler, Long and Wenderoth (1985) .
In addition to current purchased inputs (Xt ), lagged Xt is
included to allow for any carry-over effects of inputs such as
fertilizer.

Production is also assumed to be a function of

soil depth, SDfcf an(j current and past weather, W t and
where weather is measured as the absolute deviation from
average summer rainfall.

Absolute deviation is used because

too much rain will pond in low areas thereby drowning the
crop, and too little rainfall will stunt the plant.

In

addition, Thompson (1985) states that the relationship
between weather variables and yield (for soybeans) can be
represented by a parabolic curve.
defined as CP^. an(j
wt.

The choice variables are

an<j the state variables as SDf. and

We assume that Xt , Xt-1, CPt.^, and SDt are normal

inputs and therefore

S 2 and S 4 and S 5 are non negative.

However as the absolute deviation from normal rainfall
increases, we expect yield to fall.
signs on Sg and S 7 are negative.

Hence, the expected

Last period's yield is

expected to be negatively related to current yield because
the greater the yield, the lower the carry-over of purchased
inputs.

Finally, the sign of CP^. is expected to be negative

because as CPfc increases, the adjusted yield (by definition)
should decrease.

11.4.4

Cost Equation
The quadratic cost equation is somewhat more complex

1
-45than the production function and is represented by : 2
Ct

=

r0 + riRtXt + r2/2(Dt-SDtK ) 2
+ r3/2(CPt-CPt-j) 2

(11.34)

The first term represents the fixed costs associated with
growing potatoes.

The second term is what one would

normally think of as variable costs (i.e., input prices
times input quantities).

The third term admits symmetric

costs associated with variation from the optimal ratio of
debt and soil depth.

In this case, since farm debt is

largely collateralized by farm land (which has its value
defined by the sum of the discounted future net returns),
one would expect that as soil depth declines and the asset
value of land falls, that the optimal debt supported by the
land would also fall.

The symmetry is approximate and

follows from the following reasoning:

Borrowing too much

increases both the risk of default and the interest rates
faced by the farmer.

On the other hand, borrowing too

little causes the farmer to forego economies of scale.

A

rule of thumb used in the agricultural finance literature
for a reasonable level of debt is 40 percent of assets
(Drabenstott and Duncan 1985) .

If it is assumed that

cropland prices in Aroostook County are $300 per acre, and
that top soil depth is

12

inches, then:

(Dt / S D t )

=

k

or:
K = <Dt/SDt )
K = (.4 [300]/12)

(1 1.35)
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The final term represents the costs associated with the
adjustment of one of the choice variables, CP.
<CPt-CPt-l)

Recall that

ttie change in soil management (rotation).

As

such, this last term can be construed as a symmetric cost of
adjustment component of total costs.

The approximate symmetry

derives from the argument that increasing the proportion of
potatoes in the rotation will require additional storage
facilities or larger equipment and will require additional
applications of pesticides.

Lowering the proportion of

potatoes in the rotation will idle fixed resources such as
equipment and storage facilities.

The expected signs for r^,

r2 , and r 3 are all positive.

11.4.5

Objective Function
The objective of the representative farm is to

maximize its expected per acre present value:
MAX J = Eq £ t= 0 fT£Bt [Pt+ 1 Yt - Ct lJ

(11.36)

Substituting equations (11.33) and (11.34) into (11.36)
yields:
J " E0 E t=0,T^fit^Pt+lts0 + slxt + s2xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l
+ s5 SDt + s6 Wt + s7 w t _

1

+ EgY^]

“ Ir0 + rlRtxt + r 2 /2(Dt-SDtK ) 2
+ r3 /2(CPt-CPt_1)2]))

(11.37)

The technological constraints embodied in the objective
function and the equations of motion are used to find a
solution to the time invariant decisionrules

governing the
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These behavioral equations can take the

form of expectational linear stochastic difference equations.
They are derived by rearranging the first order necessary
conditions of the maximization problem.
There are a number of estimation strategies available.
Most, such as the Maximum Likelihood Riccati equation
method, are difficult and do not provide analytical
solutions.

For example, if the optimal decision rules are

time invariant (i.e., they reach some equilibrium) iterative
techniques can only suggest by brute force that such an
equilibrium exists.

This combination of estimation

difficulties and ad hoc equilibrium conditions leads one to
the Rosenman (1986) method for obtaining analytical
solutions and a reinterpretation of the three stage least
square method for estimation.

The estimation procedures

will be discussed in the following chapter.

II.4 . 6

Decision Rules
In this section the form of the optimal decision rules

are derived.

Specifically, the Euler equations (factor

demand equations) or first order necessary conditions which
can be expressed as expectational difference equations will
be computed.

The Euler equations will then be solved

utilizing the technique in Rosenman (1986).
The procedure for obtaining the Euler equations is
found in a number of sources including Sargent (1979),
Hansen and Sargent (1981), and Chow (1983).

The procedure
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1) Substitute control variables for state variables in
the objective function.
2) Obtain the first order necessary conditions
(stochastic Euler equations) by differentiating the
objective function with respect to the choice variables.
3) Canonically factor the Euler equations so that the
choice variables are functions of their own lagged values
and the conditional expectations on future state variables.
Recall the objective function, equation (11.37):
J = EQ E t=o,TtBtl-Pt+l *s0 + slXt + s2Xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l
+ s5SDt + s 6W t +

-Ir0 +

+ SgY^]

+ r 2 / 2 (Dt-SDtK ) 2

+ r 3/2(cpt-cpt_ 1 )2 i n

The first step would be to substitute the transition equation
(11.27):
=

ag + ajxt + a 2 CPt + a 3 SDt + a^G^.

into equation (11.37), but since SDf c + 1 does not appear in
(11.37), it is possible to directly take the first derivative
of J with respect to the choice variables, CP and X.
First the Euler equation for Xt £s derived.

The

partial of J (Equation 11.37) with respect to Xfc is:
dJ/dXt = BlPt+1 - riRt

(11.38)

Moving ahead one period:
J = E0

2

t=l,T^B^ Pt+2 fs0 + slxt+l + s2xt + s3CPt+l + s4CPt

+ s5SDt+i + S6 Wt+i + S 7 Wt + sgYt]
_[r0 + riRt+lXt+ 1 + r 2 /2(Dt+l-SDt+lK) 2
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+ r3/2(CPt+l-CPt)2]})

(11.39)

Substitute (11.27) for
J = E0 Z t=0,TBtfPt+2Is0 + Elxt+1 + s2xt + s3CPt+l + s4CPt
+ S 5 (Sq +

+ a 2 CP.t- + a^SD-j. + a 4 G^)

+ s6 wt+l + s7wt + s 8 yt^ "fr0 + rlRt+lXt+l
+ r 2 /2(Dt+ 1 -(aQ +ajxt + a2CPt + a3SDt + a4Gt ) K ) 2
+ r 3 /2(CPt+1 -CPt )2]3

(11.40)

and take dJ/dX^ again:
dJ/dXfc = B[s 2 Pt + 2 + s5 a 1 P t + 2 “ r2a4alGtR2 “ r2a3alCPtK
-r2 a 1 a2 SDtK 2 - r 2 a 1 2 XtK2 - r2 a 1 aQK 2 + r 2 a 1 Dt+1 K]

(11.41)

Combining (11.38) and (11.41) yields the first order necessary
condition for a sequence of {Xfc} to maximize the objective
function.

Dividing by B yields:

"r2K2aia0 + B _1s1Pt+1 - B~1r 1R fc + (s2 +s3a1 )Pt+2 - r2K 2aia4G t

" r 2 K 2 ala 3 CDt -r 2 K 2 ala 2 SDt - r 2 K 2 a 1 2 Xt
+ r 2 KalDt+l

= 0

(11.42)

Rearranging (11.42) and taking expectations results in:
r2 R2 alxt = - r 2 R 2 ala

0

- B"lrlRt + B"lslEtPt+l

+ (s2 + s5a1)EtPt+2
r2x 2 ala4Gt “ r2x2 ala3CPt “ r 2 R2 ala 2 SDt
(11.43)
or
xt = m 0 +

+ m 2 EtPt + 1 + m 3 EtP t + 2 + m 4 Gt + m 5 CPt

+ m 6 SDt + ti7 EtDt + 1
where:
m o = -aoa i

ral ■ -r 1 (BK2 r 2 a 1

)- 1

(11.44)

-50m2 = si(BK2 r 2 ai 2

)_1

m3 = (s2 + s5al)(BK2 r 2 ai2)
m4 = "a4al

1

n>5 = - 3 3 a!

1

m 6

= “a 2 al_ 1

m 7

= (Ka^

1

-1

Note that in the case of purchased inputs the decision rule
is not an expectational difference equation.

Recall that it

has been assumed that X is a normal input, hence the sign on
m^ is expected to be negative.

The sign on m4 , since

is

viewed as a subsidy payment, is expected to be positive.

If

X is complementary with SD, then mg is expected to be
positive.

Soil management and X may be viewed as

substitutes, hence the expected sign on CP would be
negative.

The signs on P t + 1 and p fc+ 2 depend on the

substitution between periods.

Lastly, the sign on

is

expected to be positive if a 1 is greater than zero.
The decision rule for CP is more complex because it
includes endogenous expectations.

Again, as with purchased

inputs, the process begins by taking the partial of J with
respect to CPt .
dJ/dCPt = s 3 P t + 1 - r 3 (CPt - CP,..!)

(11.45)

and next period's derivative is:

dJ/dCPt = B [s4 Pt + 2 + s5 a 3 Pt + 2 - r2a4a3K2Gt - r2a3zK2CPt
—r 2 a 2 a^K2 SD^. — r 2 a 3 a^K2^^ — r 2 a 3 aQK 2

Combining

+r2a3KDt+l “ r3^CPt+l “ CE>t ^
(11.46)
(11.45) and (11.46) and collecting CP terms yields:

4
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B'lr3CPt-l " (B_1 r 3 - r 2 k 2 a 3 2 + r 3 )CPt - r 3 CPt + 1
=

+ r3a3 aoK2 “ B"ls3Pt+l
_<S4+a3s5>pt+2 + r2a3a4K^Gt + r2a2a3R2sDt
^ ^ 2 a 3 *^l^ Rt

^2a3RBt+l

(11.47)

or

"r 3CPt+ l + (-B_ l r 3 " r 2K2a 22 ♦ r 3)CPt +B_1r 3CPt _1
= [•]

(11.48)

Applying the expectations operator and dividing by (_r3) one
obtains:
EtCPt+l - f- ® " 1 - r3"lr2a22 K 2 + 1)CPt - B“lcPt-l
= ' r3~lr2a3a0k2 + B"ls3r3EtPt+l + r3_1(S4 + a3s5>EtPt+2
r3 lr2a4a3k2Gt “ r3 lr2a2a3k2sDt ~ r3 lr2a3alk2xt
+ r3_lr2a3kEtDt+l

(11.49)

Solving for EtcP t + 1 yields:
Etcpt+1 = “ r3 lr2a3a0k2

+ ( l - r 3“1r 2a 22k2 “ B_1)CPt + B_1CPt _1
+ B
"

1

^"3

s3 r 3

1

E 1 Pt + 1 + r3

r 2 a 4 a3k

r3

1

(s4 + a 4 s5 )EtP t + 2

r 2 a 2 a3k SD^

r3

+ r3_lr2a3kEtDt+l

r 2 a3 a^k
(11.50)

Unfortunately the above equation cannot be estimated in
its current form because of the expectational term on the
left-hand side.

Notice however, that

EtCPt+l = CPt+i ♦ et

(H.51)

where efc j.s a serially independent, identically distributed
residual generated by errors in expectations.

By substituting

(11.51) into (11.50) and lagging, an estimable form is
realized.
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CPt = ZO + ziCPt-1 + Z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l
+ z5 G t-l

+ z 6 EBt - l

+ Z7Xfc-l

+ zgDt

+ e f l

(11.52)

where
zO = -r3 ^r2a3a0K^
Z 1

=

Z 2

= B" 1

1

- r 3 'lr2 a 2 2

z3 = B_ls3r3- 1
Z4 = r3 ^ ^s4+a3s5)
Z5 = -r3 lr2a4a3R2
z 6

= -r3"lr2a2a3K2

Z7 = "r3_lr2a3alK2
= ^3
2 ®3^
It is worthwhile to discuss briefly the structural

Z8

components of the coefficients in the soil management
equation.
present.

Note that in

through

Zg,

the ratio of r2^r3 *s

This implies if costs are more sensitive to the

soil depth to debt ratio than to the costs of adjusting the
rotation, then the influence of all non rotation variables
in the soil management decision rules will be increased.

In

addition, the greater the sensitivity of soil depth to the
rotation, the greater the influence of these same variables
on the soil management decision rule.

Finally, if the

optimal soil depth to debt ratio (K) increases, so will the
impact of debt, soil depth, purchased inputs and government
cost sharing on soil management.
Because there is no data on total farm costs, it will
be impossible to estimate the parameter of cost equation

directly.

However, the cross equation restrictions will

allow estimation of the cost equation parameters if they are
identified.

Identification in this case requires that the

structural equations including the factor demand equations
for both X and CP be estimated.
As for the expected signs of the coefficients in the
soil management Euler equation, it is expected that the
coefficient on expected price is positive.

In other words,

higher future prices will encourage conservation.

In

addition, it is expected that if Xfc and CPt are substitutes,
then the sign on

will be negative.

The sign on SD may

be negative because as soil depth declines, since the land
base suitable for cropland is fixed, the remaining asset
becomes more critical to production.

In essence the SD term

provides the farmer with information regarding his location
on the yield-soil depth curve.

In addition, very shallow or

very deep soils should send weaker signals for conservation
than moderately eroded soils where yields are being affected
significantly by soil depth.

Since the soils of Aroostook

County have been cropped for at least 100 years, it is
assumed that soil depth's influence is negative and very
small.

The sign of Gt is difficult to gauge.

The reason

for this is that G is measured in terms of Agriculture
Conservation Program (ACP) cost sharing payments, which are
more closely allied with enduring conservation practices.
As such, increasing G may allow a farmer to apply practices
like a diversion to reduce his erosion rate, while at the

-54same time holding constant or increasing his rotation
intensity.

Finally, higher debt, if r3f

r2

an(j

&3

are

positive, ought to encourage conservation.

II.4.7

Summary
The equations to be estimated and the cross equation

parameter restrictions are summarized below.
Production Function;
Yt

=

s0 + slXt + s2Xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l + s5SDt

+ s 6 w t + s 7 W t _ 1 + s 8 Yt-l
Transition Equations;
SDt+l = a0 + alxt + a2SDt + a3CPt + a4Gt
Etpt + 1 =

b 0

+ blpt + b 2 pt-l

Et°t+ 1 = c 0 + clDt + c 2 °t-l
Euler Equations;
CPt = z0 + zlCPt-l + z2cpt-2 + z3pt +

2

4Etpt+l

+ z5Gt-l + z 6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z 8 °t + et-l
xt = m 7 + mjRt + m 2 Pt + n>3 P t + 1 + m 4 Gt
+ m5SDt + m 6 cpt + m 8 pt+l
where:
mo = ~a 0 ai

-1

ml = -I!(BK2

*1 ) 1

m 2 = Si(BK2r

2 \ -1

m3 = (s2 + s
m4 = -a4al_ 1
m 5 = -a3 ai _ 1
m 6

= -a 2 al- 1

f
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m7 = (Ka! ) - 1
and
z 0

= -r3 lr2a3a0R2

Z1

=

Z 2

= B'

1

Z3 = B

- r 3 ^r2 a 2 2
1
1

z4 = r 3
z5 = -r 3
Z6

1

1

<s4+a3s5*
1

r 2 a 4 a3 K2

= -r3_lr2a2a3K2

z7 = -r 3
z 8

S3 r3

1

r 2 a 3 a1 K 2

= r3_lr2a3K

The coefficients in the cost equation,

Ct = r0 + r^tXt + r2/2(Dt - SDtK)2
+ r3/2(CPfc - CPt.i)2
can be computed by rearranging

m 2 and zg.

^

= -m 1 r 2 k2 a12B

r 2

= z4 (a2al^^r3

1

r3 = “ <s2 + a2s3>z2

1

These relationships are used to reveal the parameters of the
cost equation.

CHAPTER III

MODEL ESTIMATION

III.l

Estimation Strategy

One clear indication of how new the techniques of
rational expectations estimation are can be found by quickly
reviewing the literature.

Whiteman (1983), Chow (1983),

Hansen and Sargent (1981), Lucas and Sargent (1981) and
Wallis (1980), as well as a host of others, offer a range of
techniques including Matrix Ricatti, Full Information
Maximum Likelihood, Two Stage Least Squares and so on.

One

of the objectives of this research is to identify a general
technique which, while satisfying the theoretical
constraints, is also straight forward and readily accessible
to applied economists.
Recall the optimal time invariant decision rule for
soil management (equation (11.52)).

CPt = z0 + zlCPt-l + + z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l
+ z5Gt-l + z6SDt-l 4 z7xt-l + z8°t + et-l
(III.l)
and the decision rule for purchased inputs (equation
(11.44)):
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Xt = m0 + mlRt + m2Etpt+l + m3Etpt+2 + m4Gt
+ m 5C P t + m 6SDt + m 7EtDt+1

(III.2)

Note that all variables on the right-hand side are
observable at planting time except future potato prices and
future debt.

Therefore, in order to estimate the Euler

equations, it is necessary to predict
predicting

and Dt+1.

In

and Dt+i» it is possible to use either an

autoregressive representation (AR) or a moving average
representation (MA) (or an ARMA or ARIMA representation).
Whittle (1983) shows that both the AR and MA processes are
part of a larger class of processes that are characterized
by rational spectral density functions (stationary
processes). Here Whittle provides a purely technical
definition of "rational expectations" if such expectations
are formed with linear least squares estimators.

In

addition he notes, "It is, however, the first form of the
predictor [the autoregressive process] which is the more
convenient, since this expresses

* t+1

directly in terms of

observed quantities; xfcf Xt_± ... » (p . 32).

Based on the

above, and computed autocorrelation coefficients, an
autoregressive form is adopted for the optimal linear
predictor of exogenous explanatory variables.
The model to be estimated consists of the production
function (equation (11.33)), the soil depth transition
equation (equation (11.27)), the Euler equations (equations
(11.44) and (11.52)), and an autoregressive representation
for the forecasted state variables (expected price and

-58expected debt).
Yt = so +

+ S 2 Xt_i + S3CPt-l + s4cpt + s5SDt

+ s 6 wt * s7wt-l + s8 yt-l + eYt

(III.3)

SDfc+1 = aQ + axXt + a2CPt + a 3 SDt + a 4 Gt + eSDt

(HI*4)

CPt = zQ + ZjCP,...,^ + + z2 CP t _ 2 + z 3 Pt + z4 EtPt +x
+ z5G t-l + z 6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z 8 °t + et-l

(III.l)

Xt = mO + mlRt + m2EtPt+l + m 3EtPt+2 + m4Gt
^

+ rrigSD^. +

(1 1 1 *2 )

EtPt+l = b O + blPt + b2Pt-l + eEPt

(III.5)

EtDt+l = cO + clDt + c2Dt-l + eEDt
(III.6 )
One would expect that if the above equations were
estimated individually, they would suffer from simultaneity
bias.

For example, the expected price variable in equation

(III.l) might be correlated with the error term associated
with the Euler equation.

Furthermore, the error terms

across equations may be correlated; that is, a given
exogenous shock may induce cross correlations between error
terms.
The simultaneity bias can be corrected with Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS); Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
can correct the error term correlation across equations; and
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) can be used for both
problems associated with the disturbance term.

The basic

idea for the following method is to solve the Euler
equations and create instruments for variables with
expectations.

These instruments can then be used to

re-estimate the Euler equations.

This approach is

1
;
-59attributed to David Hendry by Charles Whiteman (1985).
Recall that in a rational expectations model the
subjective expectations of the economic agent are equal to
the objective expectations plus a random error term.

In

constructing the above model it was first assumed that the
underlying structure of the objective expectations process
takes an autoregressive form.

Next it was assumed that the

subjective expectations are conditional on the information
set.

In turn the information set is defined as those

variables which lie outside the control of the economic
agent; or, in the terminology of 2SLS, they are
predetermined variables.

Fortunately, these relationships

can be incorporated into the estimation process.
The first step is to regress the six econometrically
endogenous variables (Yfc, SDt , CPt , EtPt+1, EtDt+1, and Xt)
on all the predetermined variables.

By doing this the model

is actually estimating the subjective (or conditional)
expectations.

Next, in the second step of Two Stage Least

Squares, the fitted econometrically endogenous variables
(derived from the first stage) are substituted for the
original variables and each of the six equations are
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).

Interestingly

enough, in performing the above regressions the rational
expectations conditions are satisfied.

In equations (III.5)

and (ill.6 ), the subjective expectations are regressed on
the objective expectation process.

Finally, in the third

stage the Seemingly Unrelated Regression is employed to

M

-60estimate all six equations at one time thereby accounting
for the cross equation correlations of the error terms.
Since the cost equation cannot be estimated directly,
it is not possible to impose nonlinear restrictions on the
coefficients of the Euler equation.

However, the cross

equation restrictions can be used to identify the cost
equation parameters.

III.2

Assumptions

As mentioned above, the fundamental assumption of
rational expectations is that economic agents have the
correct model, or more explicitly "the hypothesis of
rational expectations amounts to equating the subjective ...
distribution to the objective distribution..." (Lucas and
Sargent 1981, p. xvi).

It follows then, if the researcher

attempts to correctly model the behavior of individuals,
then he too will share this correct model.

Chow (1983)

points out that even if these two assumptions are satisfied
(i.e. the economic agents t^ave the true model and the
researcher correctly models behavior), the coefficients of
the optimal decision rule are not shared by the
econometrician and the economic agent because individuals do
not know the actual values of the parameters.

As such, Chow

suggests that no one knows how to compute the truly optimal
decision rule. Furthermore, the certainty-equivalence

-61strategy employed here assumes that the steady state is
realized for the optimal decision rule.
In addition, since aggregate data is used, what is
derived is an optimal decision rule for a representative
farmer.

This raises the question of the applicability of

the results because actual farmers might have heterogeneous
productions as well as dissimilar environments and hence
different optimal decision rules.

It is argued that the

methods of rational expectations reap benefits that
overshadow the above criticisms.

The primary source of

these benefits is the accommodation of the Lucas Critique
and a more complete neoclassical optimizing paradigm.
Equation (III.l), the optimal decision rule for soil
management, already incorporates uncertainty directly
through random errors in expectations.

Uncertainty is also

added with the assumption that the exogenous variables (the
variables the farmer cannot control or affect) evolve
stochastically, or that there are errors in the variables.
Hansen and Sargent (1980) discuss, in some detail, the need
for and nature of the disturbance term of the Euler
equation. They suggest two plausible explanations for the
error terms: (1 ) economic agents observe and respond to more
variables than the econometrician; or
"errors in variables" models.

(2 ) variants of

The use of the autoregressive

process for describing the path of exogenous variables
relies on "more variables" interpretation of the error
structure and the errors in measurement add to the

y#
t.

-62stochastic component of the Euler equation.

It is also

assumed that technological relationships are relatively
constant over the data period.

III.3

Data

The data used to estimate the model were obtained from
various United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Publications and can be found in the Agricultural Statistics
series.

Yield estimates for potatoes are average yields per

total acreage of oats and potatoes.

Yields were adjusted by

total acreage to capture, in aggregate data, the effect of
rotation changes on yields and to ensure that nonintensive
rotations would not dominate the model.
The soil management variable is estimated by the
proportion of oats to total acreage.

The greater the

proportion of oats, the better the soil management.

This

variable's name, "CP", was selected because of the inverse
relationship to the C and P factors in the Universal Soil
Loss Equation.

Based on interviews with local

conservationists and a review of the FARMS Data (Hepler, et
al 1985), the P factor has essentially remained constant
over time (and quite high).

Since tillage systems have only

begun to change in the past few years, the primary force
determining the C factor has been the crop rotation.

As

such, it is expected that the estimated CP will be a close
approximation of actual soil management.

-63Nonsoil inputs, Xt^ are based on a composite of
purchased and nonpurchased farm inputs for the Northeast.
It has been adjusted to a per acre basis by dividing by
total acres.
Soil depth (which can be viewed as a quantitative as
well as a qualitative input) was estimated with the
Universal Soil Loss Equation.

The rainfall factor (R) is

constant over time and set at 75.

The soil erodibility

factor (K), length of slope (L) , and percent slope (S) were
obtained from the FARMS data.

It is assumed that K and S

are constant over time, which is not unreasonable because
erosion rates are low enough over the sample period that K
will not vary significantly.

L can be changed only with

diversions or terraces, which have not changed significantly
during the sample period.

The FARMS data were used to

estimate the P value which again, according to interviews,
has not in aggregate changed over the sample period.
factor was estimated with rotation data:

The C

A starting soil

depth is assumed and the erosion rate is computed for each
year.

The erosion is then converted to inches and

subtracted from the prior year's soil depth.

Estimated soil

depths compare well with measured depths (wooded vs. cropped
soils) .
The weather (W) variable is the absolute deviation
from summer rainfall for Presque Isle, Maine.

The theory

here is that too much or too little rain will retard yields.
The government variable (G) is real ACP cost sharing per

acre for the state of Maine.

The potato prices (P) are real

potato prices for the state of Maine.

The debt variable (D)

is total real farm mortgage debt in the Northeast per acre
of Aroostook cropland.

Finally, the price of nonsoil inputs

(Xt) is an index of prices paid by farmers in the Northeast.
All nominal dollars have been adjusted to 1967 values using
the Consumer Price Index.
In order to produce a stationary data set, the data
were logged, demeaned, and differenced twice.

Inspection of

the plotted data, autocorrelation coefficients, and
descriptive statistics suggests that the data are in fact
stationary.
Appendix.

For more detailed information, see the Data

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

IV. 1

Estimated Coefficients

The model was estimated by the microcomputer version
of RATS.

The RATS Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three

Stage Least Squares (3SLS) routines were used to estimate
the six equation model detailed in Chapter II.

As noted

earlier, one drawback of using 3SLS is that if one of the
equations is improperly specified and its error term is
correlated with the disturbance in other equations, then any
efforts to exploit this correlation to improve the
asymptotic efficiency of the estimated coefficients will
transmit the bias across all the equations.

With this in

mind, the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates are discussed below.
Because of the relatively poor specification of the
production function and especially the purchased inputs
factor demand equation there was some concern about using
the 3SLS results.

Consequently, both the results for the

2SLS and 3SLS estimations are reported in Table IV.I.

See

the regression results in the Appendix for detailed results.

Choosing between the two sets of coefficients is difficult
at best.

There was little difference between the sets of

estimated coefficients in terms of sign or magnitude.
However, as would be expected, the 3SLS estimates are more
efficient.

It is on this basis that the 3SLS estimates will

be used to analyze the model.
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TABLE IV. 1
Comparison of 2SLS and 3SLS Estimated Coefficients
Equation
SD(t)

Y(t)

CP(t)

Variable
X(t-l)
SD(t-1)
CP(t-l)
G{t-1)
X (t)
X{t-1)
CP(t)
CP(t-l)
SD (t)
W(t)
W(t-l)
Y (t- 1 )
CP(t- 1 )
CP(t-2)
P(t)
E(t)P(t+1 )
G(t-l)
SD(t-l)
X(t-l)
D(t)

2SLS
0.002

3SLS
0.002

0.272

0.291

0.002

0.002

-0.000005

-0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0

0.140
0.975
-0.351
-0.327
-34.360
-0.055
-0.055
-0.725

0.302
1.739
-0.276
-0.088
19.520
-0.034
-0.031
-0.691

-0.701

-0.355
-0.117
0.008

0.011

0.043
0.116
-0.006
-144.325
-0.904
-0.464

-0.009
-63.100
0.989
-0.787

-0.028
0.044
0.006
-0 . 0 0 2
-0.364
-11.364
0.229

0.213
0.070
0.013
-0.007
-0.701
-23.105
0.194

0.100

X(t)

R(t)
E(t)P(t+1 )
E (t)P(t+ 2 )
G(t)
CP(t)
SD (t )
E(t)D(t+ 1 )

E(t)P(t+1 )

P(t)
P(t-l)

-0.856
-0.482

-0.871
-0.288

E(t)D(t+l)

D(t)
D(t-1 )

-0.380
-0.700

-0.290
-0.517
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The 3SLS estimated coefficients, their standard errors
(in parenthesis) and the Standard Error of the Estimate
(SEE) (the square root of the sum of squared residuals
divided by the degrees of freedom) for each equation are
reported below.

Note that the R 2 and F statistics are not

reported because 3SLS does not produce a valid estimate.

In

addition, since lagged dependent variables appear in all but
the production function, the RATS computed Durbin-Watson
statistic is not meaningful.
Yt =

.00389 + .3023Xt + l ^ e e x ^ !
(.0216)

(.3908)

(.3418)

- .2756CPt - .0884CPt_1
(.1830)

(.2082)

+ 19.5184SDfc _ .03390Wt - .0307Wt_1 - .6907Yt_1
(51.3983)

(.0147)

(.0170)

(.1156)
SEE = .1394

SDt

=

-.00003 + .0015Xt_1 + ,2907SDt_1 + .0025CPt_1 - .OOOOlGt.!
(.00005)

(.0009)

(.1415)

(.0004)

(.00002)

SEE = .00031

CPt = -.0013 - -3546CPt_1 - .1174CPt_2 + .1001EtPt+1 +.0085Pt
(.0166)

(.1239)

(.0731)

(.0233)

- .0086G^._^ _ 63.0998SDt._i + .9890Xt_i
(.0042)

(27.5365)

(.0162)
- .7869EtDt

(.2097)
SEE = .1093

(.1714)

\;
\
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xt = .0018 + .2131Rt + ,7003EtPt+1 + .0126EtPt+2 - .00673Gt
(.0126)

(.2072)

(.0169)

(.0094)

(.0030)

- .7007CPt - 23.1052SDt + .1944EtDt+1
(.0890)

(21.3994)

(.1645)
SEE = .0849

EtPt+i = -.0242 - .8712Pt - .2878?^..!
(.1110)

(.1331)

(.1314)
SEE = .6286

EtDt+l = “

*0 0 1 4

(.0093)

“ .2898Dt - .5167Dt_1
(.1318)

(.1313)
SEE = .0526

As discussed in Chapter II, it is possible to reveal
the parameters of the unobserved cost equation because its
parameters (through cross equation restrictions) are
functions of the estimated parameters.

Assuming an interest

rate of ten percent, the cost equation is:
C = -.92Rtxt + 5944.88 ( D - S D k )

2

+ 5.483 (CP^CPt.!)2

The above coefficients will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.
As a first step in the analysis of the results. Table
IV.2 provides a summary of those variables which have
estimated coefficients that are statistically different than
zero.

-70TABLE IV. 2
Statistical Significance
Equation
Yt

Variable
Const
vt
&

-

*
1

SDt- 1
St
St-i
Yt-i
SDt

90% Confidence Level

*
*

*

Const
*

*

CPt

Const
CPt-l
SPt- 2
Xt
EiPt+l
Pt
sB-1

t-i
xt—i
Dt
Xt

Const
Rt
P

P ^ 2

cBt

*
*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*

SDt
EtDt+l
EtPt+l

Const

EtDt+l

Const
j>t
Dt- 1

*
*
*
*

-71From a statistical significance perspective, the Euler
equation for purchased inputs performed the worst of the six
equations estimated (i.e., only 3 of the 7 estimated
coefficients were statistically different than zero).

In

fact, the large variance in this equation and the production
function is suspected as the cause of problems encountered
in additional SUR iterations where the convergence criteria
is less than 0.1.

That is, as its error was spread across

other equations, the parameter estimates changed
dramatically.

This underscores the need to have properly

specified models and good data to estimate multi-equation
models.
Arguably more important than statistical significance
is the economic significance of the estimated coefficients.
The relationship between statistical significance and
economic significance has most recently been discussed in a
series of articles by Learner (1983); McAleer, Pagan and
Volker (1985); and Learner (1985).

As McCloskey (1985)

points out, it is the responsibility of the researchers to
identify whether or not an estimated coefficient is large or
small, important or unimportant.

Furthermore the overworked

"t test" was intended to account for small sample bias - not
to determine the economic significance of variables.

In

light of the above, and recognizing that correct signs do
not alone imply economic significance, signs of the
estimated coefficients will be evaluated.
Summarizing material from Chapter II, recall that the

-72transition equation coefficients were all hypothesized to be
greater than zero.

However, it should be noted that the

inputs may be conserving or depleting in terms of soil use.
Since a rather crude index of inputs is utilized, it is
difficult to apriori identify the expected sign.

(Timmons

maintains that they substitute for inherent soil
productivity.)

Finally, although soil depth is

monotonically decreasing, we cannot unambiguously determine
the sign of the soil depth variable on lagged values of
itself.
The production function has a more straight forward
interpretation of the expected signs.

It is expected that

since purchased inputs, lagged soil management and soil
depth are all normal factors of production, a positive
change in their use would illicit a positive change in
yield. Contemporaneous soil management should have a
negative sign because by definition raising it will lower
adjusted yields.

In addition, since weather is measured as

the sum of the absolute deviation from average rainfall, and
given the assumption in Section 11.5.3, the expected sign of
weather is negative.

Finally, because high prior yields may

deplete the soil, the sign on lagged yield is negative.
With respect to the soil management equation, if
expected price is taken parametrically, then an increase in
the price received would be soil conserving (see McConnell's
results), and the demand for soil management (i.e. CP) would
increase.

As such one would expect positive signs.

Furthermore, a lower soil depth increases the demand for CP
because a lower soil depth increases user costs.

In

addition, the sign on purchased inputs will be negative if
soil management and X are substitutes.

The expected sign on

expected debt is difficult to explain, but the underlying
mathematics suggest that it is negative.

All the

coefficients in the cost equation are expected to be
positive, given the discussion in Chapter II.
In the input demand equation it is expected that the
sign on R will be negative, and the sign on prices will be
positive.

Based on reasoning symmetrical to the soil

management equation, the signs on SD and CP are both
negative.

Finally, expected debt may be positively

correlated with the demand for inputs insomuch as an
expected increase in debt may be met with additional inputs
in the current period.

However, as with the soil management

equation, the sign on debt is difficult to predict.
IV.2 summarizes the above material.

Table

In summary, including

the indeterminate signs, the expected sign was realized 77
percent of the time.

In addition, note that 90 percent of

those signs statistically different than zero were correctly
anticipated.

The above suggests that the estimated model

performs rather well when judged against a theoretical
benchmark like expected signs.
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TABLE IV. 3
Expected and Estimated Signs
Equation

SDt

Yt

Expected
Sign

Variable

c£t
-1
-1

I*
+

Gt- 1

?
+

xt

+

Sfci

:

S r 1

:

Estimated
Sign
+
+
+

Estimated Sign
90% Confidence

0

+
+
0

+
+

0

+
0

+
+

0
0

*t-l
CPt

CPt_i

?

; t e ,

:

0

ill
1
X

+
+

0

+

+

0

+
+
+

0

:
:

Rt

Xt

E tpt + 1
?tpt + 2

+

cft

:

SDZ^
EtD t + 1
Ct

?fiXt

re v ■;r-

0

0

2

(Cpt-cPt-i)
*

+

»

+

+

+
+

+

0
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IV.2

Residual Analysis

As a final topic in the discussion of the estimation
results, the residuals will be analyzed.

The residuals for

each of the six estimated equations were evaluated in the
following manner:
The residuals were plotted over time
The means and variances were computed
The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelations
were computed
The plots of the residuals do not show any suspicious
patterns except that the mean of the soil depth equation
appears to increase slightly, depending upon the sample
period selected.

All residual means were not statistically

different than zero.
In addition, autocorrelations and partial
autocorrelations for seven years were computed for each
residual.

Vandaale (1983) suggests the 99 percent

confidence limits for autocorrelations can be approximated
by +/- t/n*^.

Using this test, none of the autocorrelations

or partial autocorrelations were statistically different
than zero.

As such, it is not possible to reject the null

hypothesis that the errors follow a white noise process.
Finally, covariance/correlation matrix for the error
terms is given by Table IV.4.
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TABLE IV-4
3SLS Covariance/Correlation Matrix
Y
Y
SD
CP
EP
X
D

.013
.000

.004
-.044
.004
.002

SD

CP

-.161

.413
-.078
.008
.004
.006

.000
-.000
.000
-.000
.000

.002

-.642
.078
.080
.352
-.000

-.008

D

X

EP

.454
-.105
.923
-.008
.005
.002

.237
.154
.378
-.259
.408
.002

The diagonal elements are the variances; the lower triangle
is the covariance; and the upper triangle is the
correlation.
Note that after three iterations of the seemingly
unrelated regression routine, there is a strong {greater
than .7) correlation between the errors only in the input
demand equation (X) and the soil management Euler equation
(CP) .

Efforts to exploit this correlation with further SUR

iterations (by lowering the convergence criterion) results
in dramatic changes in the estimated coefficients and
failure to converge.

This is most likely due to the errors

resulting from the poor specification of the production
function and purchased inputs Euler equation being spread
across other equations.

To circumvent this problem, the SUR

technique was applied to all but the input demand equation,
but the results did not change significantly.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS

The analysis of the estimated model will begin with a
brief discussion of each of the structural equations and
then proceed to a section where several hypotheses presented
in the literature review section are empirically evaluated.
A discussion of policy analysis is also provided.

V. 1

V.1.1

The Structural Equations

Transition Equation
As displayed in the previous chapter, the soil depth

transition equation had only two variables that were
statistically significant, lagged values of itself and soil
management.

The government cost sharing variable had a

negative sign but it was not statistically different than
zero.

The positive sign on the purchased inputs variable

suggests that these inputs can enhance the soil resource.
Whether this means that they actually reduce erosion rates
or they substitute for qualitative variables is unclear. The
estimated elasticities reveal that soil depth is relatively

-78inelastic to changes in inputs, soil management and
especially to government cost sharing.
Note that with data that has been logged and twice
differenced, the coefficients may be interpreted as the
change in percentage change, or the change in elasticity,
whereas the slope coefficients for a logged and once
differenced data set can be interpreted as measures of
elasticity.

If the stationarity of the first differencing

is close to that of the second differencing, then the
estimated coefficients will not change.
model was run with once differenced data.

To check this, the
By-in-large the

coefficients were similar to the twice differenced data,
except for the coefficients on soil depth. As such, for
expository purposes the term elasticity will be used to
describe the relationship measured by the coefficients
estimated with twice differenced data.
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TABLE V.l
Soil Transition Equation Elasticities

Elasticity

Average Per
Cent Change

.002

SDt-i

.291*

O
*0
ft
1
M

X
ft
1
H

Variable

.002

Percent Change
in Soil Depth

3.4

.01

.2

.06

10.2

.02

.0004
.00001
37.8
Gt-i
* Statistically different than zero at 90% level
of confidence.
Table V.l displays how the average yearly change in a
variable influences soil depth.

Overall the annual rate of

soil depth change is not very sensitive to any of the
independent variables, thus reflecting the slow rate at
which soil depth declines.

However, given the above data,

the average annual change in soil management has twice the
effect as an average annual change in purchased inputs.
One plausible explanation for the negative coefficient
on the government variable is that cost sharing is directed
more toward conservation practices like diversions and
waterways.

The installation of such practices would, in

theory, allow the farmer to maintain or increase the
intensity of his rotation; hence, it is possible to argue
for government cost sharing having offsetting effects and an
indeterminate influence on erosion rates.

Another

-80explanation for the negative sign on the government variable
is that soil conservation efforts have been targeted toward
shallower soils, thus reducing their effect in aggregate.

V.l.2

Production Function
In terms of output elasticities, potato production

appears to be rather responsive to changes in soil depth (a
one percent decrease in soil depth results in a 19.5 percent
drop in potato production).

The following table shows how a

one standard deviation change in inputs will affect output.
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TABLE V. 2
Production Function Elasticities

Input

Elasticity

Percent Change
in Output

Average Per
Cent Change

.302

3.4

1.03

xt-l

1.738*

3.4

5.91

CPt

-.276

10.2

2.81

CPt-l

-.088

10.2

.90

SDt-l

19.518

0.2

3.90

Xt

wt

-.034*

51.5

1.75

Wt- 1

-.031*

51.5

1.60

Yt- 1

-.691*

9.3

6.42

Statistically different than zero at 90%
level of confidence.
As the information in Table V.2 indicates, output is
most sensitive to lagged inputs and lagged output.

That

there is a positive carry-over effect associated with
purchased inputs is not surprising.

What is surprising is

that it dominates the influence of contemporaneous outputs.
Certainly inputs like pesticides (a large part of the crop
budget) and fertilizer do have a carry-over effect, but that
they have a larger influence than current applications on
the variation in yields was unexpected.

Soil depth

(although not statistically significant) has an impact of
the same order of magnitude as lagged inputs.

This suggests

-82that the technological relationships are sending a
moderately strong signal to farmers concerning the
importance of soil depth to production.
Finally, the impact on production by the lagged
rotation (CP) is relatively minor.

In fact both CP terms

were not statistically different than zero.

As such, the

carry-over effects of a rotation change appear to be
minimal.

V.l.3

Soil Management Factor Demand
The soil management Euler equation is the centerpiece

of this research.

The manner in which the factor demand

equation for soil management was formulated allows the
direct determination of the existence and nature of the
decision rule’s stability.

The soil management difference

equation takes the following form (holding all other
variables constant):
CPt = Z^CPt_! + Z 2 CP t _

2

The solution to this difference equation is:

yt _ 7 t
- Zjx

x

1

,n

+ Z2 X

t— 2

where CPfc = xt
which reduces to:
* 2

- ZlX - Z2 = 0

Using the quadratic formula, the roots of the difference
equation are:
X 1

= (-Zi + (Zi2 ~ 4z2 )-5)/2

x2 = ("Zl - (Zi2 " 4Z2)-5)/2

-83The estimated values for Z1 and Z2 are -.354 and -.117,
hence the roots of the difference equation are:
= .208
x2 = -.562
Since the absolute value of both roots is less than unity,
and the sign on the larger root is negative, the equilibrium
path is characterized by dampened oscillations.

However, by

ignoring the fact that EtPfc+l is also a function of
and CPt_ 2 '

coefficients on CP t _ 2 and CP t _ 2 are

misrepresented.

After substituting the subjective

expectations for EfcPt+^, the Z^ and z2 terms in the soil
management difference equation become -.16 and .19,
respectively.

The roots of the soil management decision

rule are now complex, but since -Z1 < if the rule is still
stable.

Using the following formula (Sargent 1979):
2

pi/(cos-l(Zl/(2-(z2)-5)))

The period of the oscillations can be computed.

For the

soil management decision rule the period is 7.2 years.

In

sum, the soil management decision rule is stable and
features dampened oscillations.
The estimated sign on purchased inputs is positive
(but not statistically significant).

A positive coefficient

suggests that purchased inputs and soil management, as
measured here, are not substitutes.

However, unlike the

equation of motion, government cost sharing is statistically
different than zero.

The sign of the government variable is

consistent with the discussion in the transition equation

-84section where it is suggested that cost sharing might
substitute structural practices {e.g. diversions) for soil
management practices (e.g. rotations).

In addition, the

negative sign on soil depth indicates that the lower the
soil depth, the greater the demand for soil management.
This can be interpreted as meaning that much of the highly
productive soil has been eroded away and the subsoil that
remains is vitally important in the optimal decision rule.
In short, the profit maximizing rule tells the farmer to
reduce the intensity of his potato rotation in highly eroded
soils.

This is particularly true in areas where there is no

land which can be brought into production.
The sign on expected price agrees with the theoretical
sign (higher expected future prices reduce the soil use
rate).

This result makes intuitive sense because as

expected prices increase, the user cost increases.

A higher

user cost implies that less of the resource will be used,
hence higher prices are resource conserving.
Finally, the debt variable coefficient suggests that
higher debt implies better conservation.

The causal

relationship here may be that as debt increases, the farmer
cannot afford to plant as many acres of potatoes; hence his
rotation becomes less intensive and therefore his soil
management is improved.
The following table displays the sensitivity of soil
management to changes in the independent variables.
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TABLE V. 3
Soil Management Elasticities

Variable

Elasticity

Average
Percent Change

Percent Chang
Demand for i

CPt-l

-.355*

10.2

3.62

CPt - 2

-.117

10.2

1.19

Pt

.008

49.0

.39

EtPt+l

.1 0 0 *

49.0

4.90

-.009*

37.8

.34

63.100*

.2

12.62

.989

3.4

3.36

-.787*

5.2

4.09

Gt- 1
SDt-l
Xt- 1
Dt
*

Statistically different than zero at 90 percent
level of confidence.
Note that although the elasticity of the soil depth
variable is an order of magnitude higher than the other
elasticities, its effect on soil management on a
year-to-year basis is about the same as many other
variables. Interestingly enough, five variables have about
the same impact on the soil management decision:

Lagged

soil management, expected price, soil depth, inputs, and
debt. Government cost sharing and current prices have the
smallest impact.

This suggests that providing the farmer

with good information about the rate of soil loss will help
the farmer conserve soil.

However the impact of such
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technical assistance can be diluted by the impacts of other
variables. This provides quantitative support for the
contention that a farmer operates within a complex
environment which sends him a variety of contradictory
signals concerning conservation. To ignore these
relationships is to place unrealistic expectations on the
effects of technical assistance.
The soil management decision rule affords an
opportunity to investigate just how the estimated model can
accommodate the Lucas Critique.

In order to better focus on

the Lucas Critique, assume that the only variable that
changes is government cost sharing, Gt .

The simplified soil

management equation can then be written a s :
CPt = -.001 - . 3 5 0 ? ^ - .12CPt _ 2 + .10EtPt + 1 - •009Gt_1
Conventional policy analysis would suggest that if
government cost sharing were to increase by 38 percent, the
level of conservation would fall .34 percent.

Notice,

however, that government cost sharing is one of the items in
the information set used to form subjective expectations
about future prices.

See the appendix for a display of the

first stage least squares regression results which are the
subjective expectations.

Again, to simplify matters, assume

no change in the variables except for Gt .

The subjective

expectation becomes:
^tPfiUt)

= - * 016 -

-2 1 7 G t

Hence the actual change in expected price caused by a change
in government cost sharing is -10.64.

If expected price

-87changes by -10.64 percent, then the level of conservation
will fall by (-10.04)(.10), or .79 percent.

Notice that the

total change in soil management predicted by this model is
1.13 percent, not .34 percent.

This is a change 3.3 times

as great as would be predicted through conventional policy
analysis.

(Just as Muth indicated:

understate the change in variables.)

traditional models
Recall that addressing

the Lucas Critique requires the estimation of the invariant
structural parameters.

This has been accomplished by

estimating not only parameters of the production function
and the transition equation, but also the parameters of the
farmer's subjective expectations formulation process.
This sort of reasoning can be extended to all the
variables and as such Table V.3 is transformed to:
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TABLE V. 4
Soil Management Equation Elasticities with
Subjective Expectations Incorporated

Variable

Elasticity

Average
Percent Change

cpt-l

-.355

10.2

CPt- 2

-.117

10.2

Pt
EtPt+l
Gt- 1
SDt-l
Xt- 1
Dt

.008

49.0

.100

49.0

.009

37.8

63.100

.2

.989

3.4

-.787

5.2

Percent Change
in Soil Management
+ 1.97 = -1.65
*
-1.19 + 3.13 = 1.94

-3.62

.39 - 5.39* = -5.00
4.90*
-.34* - .79 = -1.13
12.62* - 1.43 = 11.19
3.36 + .31 = 3.05
-4.00* +

.88

= -3.21

*

** Statistically different than zero effects.
The first figure is from Table V.3, and the second
figure is the expected price contribution.
The largest influence of incorporating the subjective
expectations into the decision rule is found in the twice
lagged soil management and current price variables.

Both

switch sign, and the magnitude of the price effect increases
substantially.

In short, caution must be exercised in

predicting the effects of changes in variables that form
part of the farmer's information set.

V.1.4

Purchased Inputs
One interesting result found in the input demand

-89equation is that the price of purchased inputs (although
positive) has no statistical influence on the demand for
purchased inputs.

Ignoring any data limitations, this

suggests that farmers' demand for inputs is price inelastic.
In addition, although it also lacks statistical
significance, the coefficient on soil depth is interesting
because it suggests that the shallower the soil, the greater
the application of purchased inputs.

This is entirely

plausible if soil depth is "augmented" by purchased inputs,
which the coefficient on soil depth in the transition
equation suggests.
Like the soil management equation, the government cost
sharing variable is negative and statistically different
than zero.

This indicates that increasing government cost

sharing reduces the per acre application of inputs.

This

may be a result of government cost sharing increasing the
proportion of potatoes grown: assuming an upper limit on
total borrowing, purchase of inputs may not proportionally
increase as much as the increase in potato acreage.
result is lower input levels per acre.
The following table summarizes the elasticity
relationships in the purchased input demand equation.

The
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TABLE V. 5
Purchased Input Demand Equation Elasticities
Variable

Elasticity

49.0

3.43

.013

49.0

.64

-.007*
*
-.701

37.8

-.99

Etpt + 2

SDt
EtDt+l

10.1

-23.105

.2

.194

5.2

1

.070*

Etpt + 1

CO
o•
r*

2.51

.213

CPt

% Change in
Demand for Inputs

2.2

Rt

Gt

Average
% Change

-4.60
1.00

Statistically different than zero at 90 percent
levels of confidence.
The effect of expected prices on the demand for
purchased inputs was as anticipated:

Higher future prices

imply greater application of inputs.

This result fits with

results obtained in the production function where the
carry-over effect of inputs made a substantial contribution
to production.
Expected debt has a positive influence on the purchase
of inputs.

Such a relationship makes sense in light of the

large carry-over effect of inputs.

Under these conditions

it would appear to be rational for a farmer to increase
input this year when, he believes debt will increase next
year.
Finally, it should be noted that like the soil

-91management decision rule there are expectational terms in
the input decision rule.

As such, the subjective

expectation was substituted into the input decision rule and
the total effects of various variables were recomputed.
Based upon the information in Table V.5, the demand for
purchased inputs is dominated by expected price, soil
management (rotation) and the soil depth.

V.1.5

Cost Equation
Again one of the interesting features of this

evaluation is that the cross equation restrictions can be
used to identify unobserved relationships.

Recall that the

marginal cost of two of the cost components were estimated
to be positive.

Perhaps the most revealing coefficients are

those on the optimal soil depth variable and the cost of
adjusting soil management.

The analysis begins with a

discussion of the cost elasticity relationship.

TABLE V. 6
Cost Equationi Elasticity

Variable
Rt*t
(D-SDK) 2
(CPfCPt-l) 2

Elasticity

Average
Percent Change
Percent Change
in Costs

-.92

7.48

5944.88

10.24

60,875.57

5.483

104.04

570.45

6.88

-92Clearly with the assumptions about K developed
earlier, the cost equation is dominated by deviations from
the optimal soil depth for borrowing purposes.

As land

values fall, K falls and the effect of the soil depth-debt
term increases.

If, on the other hand, lending institutions

allow high debt to equity ratios (for example, 1.0), then K
increases and the effect of the second cost term falls.

The

unusually large magnitude of the coefficient on the soil
depth-debt component may be due to errors in the estimated
coefficients.

In addition, the desired debt equity ratio

and land values may be in error.
The third term indicates that altering the rotation
does have, as suggested in the model development, a positive
influence on costs.

This provides some insight into why

farmers might be resistant to recommendations by
conservationists to change their rotation.
Finally, the implications of a negative marginal cost
are that total costs will fall given an increase in R or X.
This does not make economic sense and is most likely an
artifact of the positive sign on the input price coefficient
in the input demand equation, which, it should be noted, is
not statistically different than zero.

V.2

Examining the Literature

In this section a number of hypotheses drawn from the
literature review are examined.

The first item considered

-93is a fundamental relationship seen throughout the agronomic
literature:

As soil depth declines, yields fall.

The null

hypothesis is that sg is equal to zero, while the
alternative hypothesis

is that Sg ig greater than zero.

null hypothesis cannot

berejected at the 90 percent level

of confidence.

The

The reason may be that the soils in

Aroostook County may have eroded to the point where the
highly productive topsoil is lost and, as such, the subsoil
is so limited in its contribution to production that we
should expect that Sg = 0.

In short, the fact that the

coefficient on soil depth is not statistically different
than zero supports the argument for "S" shaped soil
production functions.

In such functions the soil

depth-yield function takes its

form from the logic that very

thick or very shallow soils are insensitive to losses.

It

is only when erosion is occurring in the transition from a
deep to a shallow soil that the marginal effect of soil is
significant.

Such a physical relationship could limit the

opportunity cost associated with additional depletion of the
soil resource. This in turn may explain, in part, some of
the resistance to the adoption of conservation in Aroostook
County or anywhere where soils have been severely eroded.
Recall that Ervin and Ervin (1982) concluded that
there was a weak link between conservation and government
programs. The null hypothesis here is that in the soil
management factor demand equation, government cost sharing
should have no influence, i.e. Hq: Z5=0>

In fact# at the

-9490% level of confidence, the null hypothesis is rejected.
This is contrary to the expectations of not only Ervin and
Ervin, but also many others, including Collins and Headley
(1983).

However it must be noted that the size of the

impact is relatively small, which may be interpreted as a
weak linkage. As such, although the null hypothesis is
rejected, it must be recognized that the influence is small
and negative.
Ervin and Ervin also suggested that high debt inhibits
farmers from adopting conservation.

The formal alternative

hypothesis would be that the sign on debt is equal to zero
in the soil management equation and the alternative
hypothesis is that the coefficient is less than zero.

The

estimated model rejects the null hypothesis (i.e., Zg =o) .
Here is a case where even when the subjective expectations
are incorporated and the effect of debt does not change.

In

short, the sign on debt in the soil management decision rule
is negative and therefore the model agrees with the
commonly-held proposition that increased debt makes it
harder for farmers to adopt conservation.
McConnell concludes from his qualitative model that
higher future prices will lower the current rate of soil
loss.

The estimated coefficient on expected price supports

this hypothesis, although the magnitude of the elasticity is
rather small.
Finally, Osteen suggests that price stability (Delta
Etpt + 1 =

0

) reduces the need to rotate and hence it has an

-95adverse effect on soil conservation.

Analyzing this will

allow us to demonstrate the multiple equilibria quality of
rational expectations models.

First we reproduce the soil

management decision rule and the subjective expectation of
future prices:
CPt = .001 - . 3 5 0 ? ^ - .12CPt _

+ .10Et |Pt + 1

2

+ .008Pt _ 63.10SDt_! - . l O X ^ ! - .008Gt - .77Dfc
Etpt+1 =

“ -02

(V.l)

+ -01Wt + .OeWt.! + 10.81Rt - 1.8. Rt_i

- 1.01Pt - .71Pt_1 - .22Gt -.13Gt_1 + 15.48Xt._i
- .44Xfc_ 2 + 71.59SDt_1 + 1.94CPt _ 1 + 3.06CPt_2
+ 24.32GPt_1 + .79GPt _ 2 + 10.36Dt - 23.36Dt_1

(V.2)

Recall that the independent variables in the above
equation are the information set and form the subjective
expectation.
By setting a price for potatoes, the expected price
term drops out of equation (V.l).
happen.

But more than that will

Notice that if the expectation equation (equation

V.2) is substituted in equation (V.l), not only the level of
conservation changes, but the equilibrium path will also
change because the CP fc_

1

an<j cPt - 2

expectation equation drop out.

terms from the

In this case the amplitude

of the oscillations will be reduced.
proposition is true:

In short, Osteen's

the need to change rotation is

diminished by setting prices.

CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS

VI. 1

Conclusions

In Chapter I the argument was made that soil erosion
is perceived by society to be a serious problem.
problem was described in two ways.

This

First, there is the

concern that the farmer's rate of soil use is greater than
the rate of erosion desired by society (T).

Second, there

is the belief that farmers have poor information about the
fundamental erosion productivity relationships; consequently
federal, state and local governments directly subsidize the
installation of many conservation practices, while also
providing technical assistance to farmers to help them
better understand the effects of erosion.
In addition, supply response models were identified as
having a great deal of potential in describing the essence
of a farmer's optimal decision rule for soil conservation.
The reasoning here is that of the six parameters in the
Universal Soil Loss Equation, the rainfall, soil erodibility
and slope factors are fixed.

In addition, since the
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time in Aroostook County, the conservation practice and
length of slope factors can also be viewed as constants.

As

such, the critical variable in soil management is the C, or
cover, factor. Because the primary means of controlling the
C factor in Aroostook County is through crop rotation
(rather than changes in tillage or cover crops), the
rotation selected by the farmer is a good proxy for soil
management. Since soil management is closely allied with the
choice of how many acres of potatoes to plant, there is a
strong linkage between soil management decisions and supply
response models.
Recent work by Eckstein in the area of supply response
models has shown that the linear quadratic rational
expectations models

fit the data as well as adaptive

expectation models.And, although they

are observationally

equivalent to adaptive models, the advantage of rational
expectations models is that they provide a richer
interpretation of the coefficients.

Furthermore, the

cyclical cobweb behavior observed in commodity markets can
be explained by the characteristics of the model rather than
by the assumption that farmers make systematic errors in
their expectations.
The literature review indicated that only recently has
research began to apply dynamic models to evaluate soil
erosion.

Moreover,

deterministic.

much of the research is qualitative or

Furthermore

it failed to model the

-98environment in which farmers make decisions.

In short, it

did not adequately describe a decision making environment
which sends a host of constantly changing, contradictory and
complementary signals.

The result is soil management

decisions which are optimal under one set of conditions may
be sub-optimal under another set of conditions.
The contribution of this dissertation is to combine
the elements of optimal control, supply response, and
rational expectations to formulate and then estimate the
farmer's optimal, time invariant soil management decision
rule.

In the process of analyzing the nature of the

decision rule, an accessible rational expectations
estimation procedure was implemented and various hypotheses
about the soil resource were examined.
In order to gain a measure of understanding of the
relationship between society's goal of intergenerational
equity (i.e., erosion rates of T) and the optimal private
rate of erosion, compare the following decision rules.

The

first is the T decision rule:
CPt = CPT = .288
The soil conservationist who uses the T value as a planning
goal is actually recommending that the farmer put 28.8
percent of his crop into potatoes, year after year.
Contrast this with the decision rule developed in this
research:
CPt = 20 + zlCPt-l + z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l
+ z5Gt-l + z6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z8 °t

-99Notice that a number of variables are allowed to influence
the farmer's soil management decision and that the optimal
CP will vary, perhaps greatly, from year to year.

By not

allowing the farmer to adjust the profit maximizing soil
management level to take into account these other variables,
the soil conservationist implicitly forces a cost on the
farmer.

In fact, even if the average soil management

decision rule results in a rotation of 28.8 percent oats,
the T rule will produce lower income.
implication here is clear.

The policy

Soil conservationists must

recognize that farmers make decisions in a complex
environment and constraining them to a rotation that
produces an erosion rate of T is income depressing.

This,

then, contributes to a farmer's resistance to applying
conservation practices.

One way to resolve this problem is

for the soil conservationist to emphasize (perhaps through
increased subsidies) structural practices that reduce
erosion by changing the slope length factor or tillage
practices, and then let the farmer make decisions about his
rotation.

Furthermore, an evaluation of the C factor

requires that long term averages be used rather than current
rotations.
The second concern raised involves the extent to which
farmers understand the consequences of erosion.

Part of the

soil conservationist's role is to educate farmers about how
the loss of soil affects his production.

It was found that

soil depth does affect the optimal soil management decision.
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the effects of soil loss, but they incorporate that
knowledge into their decision making.

This supports

McConnell's comment that:
While there may be considerable work which
attempts to develop the impact of soils on
productivity, it seems safe to conclude
that farmers are knowledgeable in this
regard; and that, in the absence of more
knowledge of these relationships, we are not
badly off by trusting our resources with
those who must make a living from them.
(McConnell 1986, p. 743)
The model, however, is an aggregate model and as such does
not rule out individual farmers who do not understand the
technical relationship between productivity and soil loss.
Consequently there may still be need for educational
programs which outline the effects of erosion.
In conclusion, it is not necessary to resort to
assumptions about farmer behavior which characterizes
farmers as ignorant of or misinformed about the physical
effects of erosion.

In essence they are better

characterized as making decisions concerning soil management
in an environment which provides incentives for rational
farmers, in a profit maximizing setting, to erode soil at
rates greater than the socially desirable rate.
Furthermore, recommending soil management practices that
restrict the farmer's ability to respond to the information
they receive will reduce their net income.

If society

values conserving soil and economic efficiency, it makes

-101little sense for society to subsidize the production of
commodities on one hand, then subsidize measures to
ameliorate problems caused by these same production
enhancement programs.

Moreover, as McConnell points out

"...I do not think there is any convincing reason that
farmers will do a worse job than anyone else in calculating
the user cost of soil loss when markets function well."
(McConnell 1986, p. 744)

As such, national policy on soil

conservation should focus first on obtaining a better
understanding of the conservation decision (which may vary
across identifiable groups), and then formulate and
administer policy which improves the transmission of and
response to conservation signals.

However, it must be

underscored that the focus here has been on the private,
on-site, effects of erosion.

Consequently this analysis has

explicitly ignored the off-site externalities of erosion. It
is here that serious market failure can occur and this is
where it may be possible to find rationale for government
intervention.

But even in implementing policy to reduce

off-site effects, it is critical that the private decision
rule of the farmer be clearly understood.

VI. 2 Recommendations for Future Research

The use of models of optimizing agents like the one
developed in this research have potential for further
application in analyzing the soil resource base.

The 1985

-102Farm Bill contains three soil conservation provisions:
conservation compliance, which prevents farmers from
obtaining federal program benefits unless their highly
erodible land is adequately protected; Sodbuster, which
penalizes farmers who bring new land into production; and
the conservation reserve program, which pays farmers to
retire highly erodible land.

Better models are needed not

only to help formulate such policy, but to fine tune it
during the development of implementation rules.
In building these models, very careful attention
should be paid to identifying the farmer's information set
and how proposed policy interventions might interact with
the information set.

In addition, the modeling approach

pursued here should be expanded to other areas, other crops
and multiple crops and various groups of farmers. Perhaps
the most serious constraints on future research is the
adequacy of data (multi-billion dollar policy making
deserves better data), and the qualification of off-site
effects.
Finally, further research on the optimum state of
conservation is warranted because, as stated in the preface,
it is "...helpful as an organizing principle in analyzing
the result of economic forces which influence
conservation...".

(Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968, p. 93)

REFERENCE NOTES
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REFERENCE NOTES

—
The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) was developed
in 1958 and is comprised of two quantitative factors and four
qualitative factors. The USLE is:
A = RKLSCP
where A is the average annual soil loss; R is the rainfall
and runoff erosivity index; K is the soil erodibility
factor; L is the slope-length factor; S is the
slope-steepness factor; C is the cover and management
factor; and P is the cultural practice factor (Wischmeier
1976).
The USLE can be used by soil conservation planners to
predict soil loss from sheet and rill erosion. The USLE is
literally an estimate of soil movement: the soil is not
necessarily lost.

2/
—
This is not to argue that rainfall is optimal, but
rather that potato productioin will migrate to climatic
zones where average rainfall most nearly meets the water
requirements of the potato plant. As such, as rainfall
patterns deviate from this average, yield will be
depressed.

—^

The following cost function
C = (a+b) [ (r1 ar2b ) (Aaabb )-1] < a+b*

is the dual of the following production function
q = AXjax2b
where a and b > 0 , x.»s are inputs, r-j's are input prices,
and q is output. Clearly the parameters and functional
form of the production function establish the form of the
cost function. In the soil resource model a cost function
is not specified.
Instead, a cost equation is
hypothesized. In addition the functional forms develped
are ment to be local approximations of the underlying
production production function and cost equation.

APPENCICES
DATA
RATS PROGRAM
FIRST STAGE REGRESSION
SECOND STAGE REGRESSION
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION

DATA
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INPUT DATA

YEAR

ADJYLD

1950.00 168.9600
1951.00 116.8831
1952.00 136.2000
1953.00 138.2500
1954.00 115.2619
1955.00 146.3096
1956.00 175.4118
1957.00 156.8963
1958.00 157.7716
1959.00 148.9696
1960.00 154.4174
1961.00 179.2857
1962.00 185.62B0
1963.00 1B9.6923
1964.00 197.7320
1965.00 174.8431
1966.00 189.6000
1967.00 188.9648
196B.00 187.7577
1969.00 173.7624
1970.00 178.5000
1971.00 198.4211
1972.00 183.8674
1973.00 158.0769
1974.00 194.6524
1975.00 156,9591
1976.00 17B.181B
1977.00 174.8148
1978.00 157.3333
1979.00 171.9565
1980.00 162.0779
1981.00 171.0968
1982.00 175.5195
1983.00 163.4783
AVE
STD
VAR
Text Code

167.B7
20.57
422.92
Y

ADJ1N

CP

NTHR

0.6489
0.6277
0.6085
0.5595
0.5476
0.5649
0.558B
0.5311
0.5431
0.5391
0.5550
0.5862
0.5652
0.5897
0.5773
0.5392
0.5400
0.5377
0.5361
0.5050
0.5100
0.5263
0.5359
0.5385
0.5294
0.5673
0.6429
0.6173
0.6242
0.6584
0.6753
0.6581
0.655B
0.7029

0.4133
0.5671
0.4000
0.4167
0.4286
0.4100
0.3824
0.4315
0.3664
0.3870
0.3257
0.2759
0.2947
0.2974
0.2784
0.2598
0.2100
0.1910
0.2010
0.2030
0.2350
0.2368
0.2541
0.2418
0.2406
0.2865
0.2468
0.2346
0.2788
0.2795
0.2987
0.3161
0.3052
0.3043

4.03
4.15
4.52
2.80
7.06
1.02
1.35
3,09
4.64
4.51
2.16
2.69
4.60
6.46
4.60
3.37
4.41
2.83
2.01
1.66
4.59
2.17
2.99
4.39
1.53
2.70
6.38
8.56
2.96
3.08
2.41
6.04
2.16
3.97

0.58
0.05
0.00

0.31
0.08
0.01

X

CP

SD1LD RINPRI

RP0TPR1

RACP

DEBT

341.193
350.900
344.654
319.600
316.770
312.968
307.125
304.864
304.850
304.696
298.760
296.B75
298.013
297.710
290.635
293.122
297.325
290.000
278.311
275.046
269.132
270.404
280.128
318.557
325.660
327.543
327.859
319.008
321.392
331.187
323.744
313.077
299.204
296.247

1.7B9
3.895
2.730
0.924
2.671
2.207
1.486
2.550
1.282
2.658
1.533
1.261
1.347
2.105
4.144
2.497
1.749
1.360
1.775
2.004
1.702
1.401
3.272
5.447
1.963
3.753
2.903
1.851
1.975
1.495
2.938
1.652
1.159
1.977

0.900 3555.55
0.807 33^4.65
0.765 3380.24
0.699 3329.68
0.680 3483.25
0.704 3870.77
0.687 3982.57
0.630 3943.76
0.627 4064.58
0.618 4214.05
0.626 4528.38
0.654 4972.76
0.624 5021.54
0.643 5534.68
0.621 5B67.21
0.571 5498.50
0.556 5493.60
0.538 5810.47
0.514 6119.37
0.460 6430.70
0.439 6492.09
0.434 7061.34
0.428 7938.57
0.405 8642.22
0.358 8677.04
0.352 9482.02
0.377 10569.14
0.340 10399.23
0.319 10343.79
0.303 11582.00
0.274 11714.8B
0,242 11321.73
0.227 11074.27
0.236 12161.40

3.70
1.71
2.94

11.17 307.28
0.29 20.38
0.09 415.16

2.22
0.97
0.94

0.52 6761.94
0.18 2B94.65
0.03 8379018

H

SO

P

6

11.570
11.554
11.546
11.530
11.515
11.500
11.484
11.467
11.453
11.434
11.417
11.386
11.357
11.331
11.305
11.276
11.243
11.205
11.158
11.115
11.072
11.035
11.000
10.968
10.933
10.898
10.B70
10.836
10.800
10,771
10.742
10.716
10.692
10.667

R

D

Adjusted P o t a t o Yield
(Levels)

200
190
180

YIELD

(e w t/a c )

170
160

150

140
130

120

110
50

54

58

62

66
YEAR

70

74

78

82

P u r c h a s e d Inputs Index
(L evels)

0.71
0.7
0.69
0.68
0.67

0.66

Index

per A cre

0.65
0 . 640.63
0.62
0.61
0.6
0.59
0.58
0.57
0.56
0.55
0.54
0.53
0.52
0.51
0.5

50

54

58

62

66

YEAR

70

74

78

82

Ratio

9

o>

in
yi

P
yi
ayi
9
a

i*
oi

kUi » Pw
M

9

—
in

Soil M a n a g e m e n t
(Levels)

Factor

(CP)

W e a t h e r (Abs Dev Fro m Ave S u m m e r Rain)
(L evels)

50

54

58

62

66
YEAR

70

74

78

82

'■*

Soil Depth
(Levels)

11.6

11.5

11.3

In c h e s

11.2
1

11

10.9
10.8
10.7
-112

10.6

50

54

58

62

66

YEAR

70

74

78

82

Real Input Price Index
(Levels)

360
350
340
330
320
310
300

290
280
270

260
50

54

58

62

66

YEAR

70

74

78

82

Real P o t a t o Price (Maine)
(Levels)

5.5

Price

($ /a c )

4.5

3.5

2.5

0.5

50

54

58

62

66
YEAR

70

74

78

82

Real G o v e r n m e n t C o s t S h a r in g
(L evels)

0.9

0.8

($ /a c )

0.6

ACP

0.7

0.5

0.4

0.3

0,2
50

54

58

62

66
YEAR

70

74

78

82

Real Far m M o r t g a g e Debt
(Levels)

13

($ /a c )

12
11

N o rth e a s t

D e b t/A rstk Cropland
(T h o u s a n d s )

10

8
7

6

5

4
3

50

54

58

62

66

YEAR

70

74

78

82

RATS PROGRAM

-118♦THIS PROGRAM PRODUCES STATIONARY DATA SERIES
♦AND THEN RUNS DISSERTATION MODEL
♦FILE NAME: DSTATN12.PGM
♦CREATED JULY 21, 1986
♦REVISED AUG 5, 1986
♦REVISED AUG 13, 1986
♦REVISED AUG 14, 1986
♦REVISED NOV 10, 1986
♦REVISED NOV 11, 1986 WITH RESTRICTIONS
♦REVISED NOV 21, 1986 ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE SPEC OF Y & X
♦REVISED NOV 23, 1986 NEW SPECIFICATION ALL STRUC EQNS
♦REVISED NOV 26, 1986 SEARCH FOR CONVERGENCE
♦REVISED NOV 27, 1986 ONE LAG TRANSITION EQUATION
Set up Calendar

*

CALENDAR

1950

11

*

♦

Allocate Space for data

ALLOCATE 0 1983,1
*
*
k
This section of RATS code inputs data
k
*

Input From a Disk File
*
OPEN(BINARY) DATA C:DISSL030.WKS
*

CLEAR ADJYLD ADJIN CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RPOTPRI RACP $
RDIST EP POTPROD DEBT
*
DATA(FORMAT=WKS,ORG=OBS) 1950,1 1983,1 ADJYLD ADJIN $
CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RPOTPRI RACP POTPROD DEBT
*
SET EP 1950,1 1983,1 = RPOTPRI(T)
SET(SCRATCH) RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 = RPOTPRI(T-l)
*

print 1 34 ADJYLD ADJIN CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RACP $
RPOTPRI EP POTPROD
*
*
*

*
*
*

TAKE LOGS

*

SET
SET
SET
SET

ADJYLD
ADJIN
CP
WTHR

1951,1
1951,1
1951,1
1951,1

1983,1
1983,1
1983,1
1983,1

LOG(ADJYLD(T))
LOG(ADJIN(T))
LOG(CP(T))
LOG(WTHR(T))
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SET SOILD 1951,1 1983,1 = LOG (SOILD (T) )
SET RINPRI 1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(RINPRI(T))
SET RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(RPOTPRI(T))
SET RACR
1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(RACP(T))
SET EP
1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(EP(T))
SET POTPROD 1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(POTPROD(T))
SET DEBT
1951,1 1983,1 = LOG(DEBT(T))
*
print 1 1 0 adjyld
*

*

*DEMEAN THE DATA
*

DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE

ADJYLD 1951,1 1983,1 0 ADJYLD
ADJIN 1951,1 1983,1 0 ADJIN
CP 1951,1 1983,1 0 CP
WTHR 1951,1 1983,1 0 WTHR
SOILD 1951,1 1983,1 0 SOILD
RINPRI 1951,1 1983,1 0 RINPRI
RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 0 RPOTPRI
RACP 1951,1 1983,1 0 RACP
EP 1951,1 1983,1 0 EP
POTPROD 1951,1 1983,1 0 POTPROD
DEBT 1951,1 1983,1 0 DEBT

PRINT 1 10 ADJYLD
*

STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISITCS
STATISTICS

ADJYLD 1951,1 1983.1
ADJIN 1951,1 1983.1
CP
1951,1 1983.1
WTHR
1951,1 1983.1
SOILD 1951,1 1983.1
RINPRI 1951,1 1983.1
RACP
1951,1 1983.1
RPOTPRI 1951, 1 1983,1
EP
1951,1 1983.1
POTPROD 1951, 1 1983,1
DEBT
1951, 1 1983,1

* TAKE FIRST DIFFERENCE
★
DIFFERENCE ADJYLD 1952,1 1983,1 1 ADJYLD
DIFFERENCE ADJIN 1952,1 1983,1 1 ADJIN
DIFFERENCE CP 1952,1 1983,1 1 CP
DIFFERENCE WTHR 1952,1 1983,1 1 WTHR
DIFFERENCE SOILD 1952,1 1983,1 1 SOILD
DIFFERENCE RINPRI 1952,1 1983,1 1 RINPRI
DIFFERENCE RPOTPRI 1952,1 1983,1 1 RPOTPRI
DIFFERENCE RACP 1952,1 1983,1 1 RACP
DIFFERENCE EP 1952,1 1983,1 1 EP
DIFFERENCE POTPROD 1952,1 1983,1 1 POTPROD
DIFFERENCE DEBT 1952,1 1983,1 1 DEBT
*
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* TAKE SECOND DIFFERENCE
*

DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE

ADJYLD 1953,1 1983,1 1 ADJYLD
ADJIN 1953,1 1983,1 1 ADJIN
CP 1953,1 1983,1 1 CP
WTHR 1953,1 1983,1 1 WTHR
SOILD 1953,1 1983,1 1 SOILD
RINPRI 1953,1 1983,1 1 RINPRI
RPOTPRI 1953,1 1983,1 1 RPOTPRI
RACP 1953,1 1983,1 1 RACP
EP 1953,1 1983,1 1 EP
POTPROD 1953,1 1983,1 1 POTPROD
DEBT 1953,1 1983,1 1 DEBT

*

PRINT 3 32 ADJYLD ADJIN CP SOILD WTHR RINPRI RPOTPRI $
RACP EP POTPROD DEBT

STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISITCS
STATISTICS

ADJYLD 1953,1 1983,1
ADJIN 1953,1 1983,1
CP
1953,1 1983,1
WTHR
1953,1 1983,1
SOILD 1953,1 1983,1
RINPRI 1953,1 1983,1
RACP
1953,1 1983,1
RPOTPRI 1953,1 1983,1
EP
1953,1 1983,1
POTPROD 1953,1 1983,1
DEBT
1953,1 1983,1

*SET NEXT PERIOD DEBT VARIABLE
SET(SCRATCH) DEBT 1953,1 1982,1 = DEBT(T+l)
* DEFINE FIRST STAGE
EQUATION 1 ADJYLD
♦CONSTANT -ADJIN 0 1 -CP 0 1 -SOILD 1 1 -WTHR 0 1 $
-ADJYLD 1 1
EQUATION 2
SOILD
♦CONSTANT -ADJIN 1 1 -SOILD 1 1 -CP 1 1
-RACP 1 1
EQUATION 3 CP
♦CONSTANT -CP 1 2 RPOTPRI EP -ADJIN 1 1 -RACP 1 1 $
-SOILD 1 1 -DEBT 1 1
EQUATION 4 EP
♦CONSTANT -RPOTPRI 0 1
EQUATION 6 ADJIN
♦CONSTANT -EP 0 -1 RINPRI RACP CP SOILD DEBT
EQUATION 7 DEBT
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*
*

•k
*

FIRST 1955,1 1982,1
♦CONSTANT -WTHR 1 2 -RINPRI 0 1 -RPOTPRI 0 1 $
-CP 1 2 -POTPROD 1 2 -DEBT 1 2 -ADJYLD 1 1 -RACP 0 1 $
-ADJIN 1 2 -SOILD 1 1
♦ADJYLD CP
SOILD EP
ADJIN DEBT
♦I ADJYLD I CP
I SOILD I EP
I ADJIN I DEBT
SECOND (EQUATIONS)
SECOND(EQUATION=2)
SECOND{EQUATION=3)
SECOND(EQUATION=4)
SECOND(EQUATION =6 )
SECOND(EQUATION=7)

ADJYLD 1955,1 1982,1 SECYERR
SOILD
1955,1 1982,1 SECSERR
CP
1955,1 1982,1 SECCERR
EP
1955,1 1982,1 SECPERR
ADJIN
1955,1 1982,1 SECIERR
DEBT
1955,1 1982,1 SECDERR

*
*

*
*

*

STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS

SECYERR
SECSERR
SECCERR
SECPERR
SECIERR
SECDERR

1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

*

CORRELATE
CORRELATE
CORRELATE
CORRELATE
CROSS
CROSS
CROSS
CROSS
CROSS

SECYERR
SECSERR
SECCERR
SECPERR

SECCERR
SECCERR
SECCERR
SECCERR
SECCERR

1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1

SECPERR
SECYERR
SECSERR
SECCERR
SECPERR

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1
1955,1

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

CROSS SECCERR SECIERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECDERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
♦ SECYERR 1955,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
♦ SECSERR 1955,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
♦ SECCERR 1955,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
♦ SECPERR 1955,1

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

PLOT(DATES)
1
# SECIERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# SECDERR 1955,1 1982,1
#
CORRELATE SECYERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SECSERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SECCERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SECPERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SECIERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SECDERR 1955,1
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL

SECYERR
SECSERR
SECCERR
SECPERR
SECIERR
SECDERR

1955.1
1955.1
1955.1
1955.1
1955.1
1955.1

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

1982.1
1982.1
1982.1
1982.1
1982.1
1982.1

*

*THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATE
*

THREE(ITER=30,EPS =.1)
#1 YERR
#2 SERR
#3 CERR
#4 PERR
#6
INERR
#7 DERR
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS
STATISTICS

6

1955,1

1955.1 1982,1
YERR
1955.1 1982,1
SERR
1955.1 1982,1
CERR
1955.1 1982,1
PERR
INERR 1955.1 1982,1
DERR 1955,1 1982,1

PLOT(DATES)
1
# YERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# SERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# CERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# PERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# INERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES)
1
# DERR 1955,1 1982,1
#
CORRELATE YERR 1955,1
CORRELATE SERR 1955,1
CORRELATE CERR 1955,1
CORRELATE PERR 1955,1

1982,1
1982,1
1982,1
1982,1

1982,

-123CORRELATE INERR 1955,1 1982,1
CORRELATE DERR 1955,1 1982,1
*

PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL
PARITAL

YERR 1955,1 1982,1
SERR 1955,1 1982,1
CERR 1955,1 1982,1
PERR 1955,1 1982,1
INERR 1955,1 1982,1
DERR 1955,1 1982,1

*

OLS (EQUATION=l)
OLS (EQUATION*2)
OLS (EQUATIONS)
OLS(EQUATION=4)
OLS (EQUATION=6 )
OLS(EQUATION=7)
★
*

CNTRL(PAUSE)

CHANGE INPUT 0
*

ADJYLD 1955,1 1982,1
SOILD 1955,1 1982,1
CP 1955,1 1982,1
EP 1955,1 1982,1
ADJIN 1955,1 1982,1
DEBT 1955,1 1982,1

FIRST STAGE REGRESSION
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FIRST STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
(Subjective Expectations)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1
ADJYLD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
9
28
OBSERVATIONS
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
.62010016
RBAR**2
R**2
.87336672
.11750350
SEE
.12426365
SSR
DURBIN'-WATSON 1 .54843339
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
LABEL
VAR LAG
NO.
************
************
*** ***
***
.2364661E-01
-. 5903263E-02
0
0
CONSTANT
1
.3854099E-01
4
- .9024408E—02
WTHR
1
2
.3546611E-01
4
-. 1593397E-01
WTHR
2
3
.9803171
-1.911137
6
0
RINPRI
4
1.063934
6
1.571785
RINPRI
1
5
.1009204
7
0
.9446167E-01
6
RPOTPRI
.9746279E-01
7
.1526143
1
7
RPOTPRI
.2956368E-01
-. 8932073E-02
8
0
RACP
8
.2770950E-01
8
-. 1397646E-01
1
RACP
9
2.448304
1.146835
2
1
10
ADJIN
.8277575
2
2
-.2727444
ADJIN
11
86.79332
5
-100.0232
1
12
SOILD
.4840879
-.2474252
3
1
13
CP
.3505246
-.1688385
3
14
CP
2
2.949062
1
.8440579E-01
POTPROD
11
15
.4043108
.1299353
16
POTPROD
11
2
.7099098
.9631539
17
12
1
DEBT
1.002945
-.4292318
2
18
12
DEBT
2.951467
-.6415512
1
19
ADJYLD
1
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
3 _
FROM 1955- I UNTIL 1982 -C P 1
FREEDOM
.66384489
RBAR**2
88794830
R**2
.89261121E-01
SEE
.71707929E - 0 1
SSR
DURBIN'-WATSON 1. 56913280
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
VAR LAG
LABEL
NO.
************
************
*******
***
***
.1796307E—01
-.5348933E-02
0
CONSTANT
0
1
.2927753E-01
-.1605181E-01
4
1
WTHR
2
.2694171E—01
.2591689E-01
4
2
WTHR
3
.7446945
1.274738
6
0
RINPRI
4
.8082140
-.2738630
6
1
RINPRI
5
.7666383E-01
-.3282933E-02
7
0
RPOTPRI
6
.7403727E-01
-.6689236E-01
7
1
RPOTPRI
7
.2245794E—01
-.5105732E-01
8
0
RACP
8
.2104943E-01
-.4222204E-01
1
8
RACP
9
1.859846
5.002855
2
1
ADJIN
10
.6288031
-.6161290
2
2
ADJIN
11
65.93224
-171.2998
5
1
12
SOILD
.3677357
-.4763511
3
1
13
CP
.2662748
.5720973
3
2
14
CP
2.240244
7.906999
POTPROD
1
15
11
.3071333
.4676713
2
16
POTPROD
11
.5392805
-.1996379
12
1
17
DEBT
.7618837
1.475842
DEBT
12
2
18
2.242072
-7.361011
1
ADJYLD
1
19
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5
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
SOILD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
9
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
28
OBSERVATIONS
.83150947
RBAR**2
.94383649
R**2
.17324786E-03
,27013338E1-06
SEE
SSR
DURBIN -WATSON 1 .82753111
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
************
*******
************
*** ***
***
.
3486471E-04
-.4261081E-04
CONSTANT
0
0
1
.5682507E-04
-.1038936E-03
4
WTHR
1
2
.5229144E-04
4
2
-.2129495E-05
WTHR
3
.1445385E-02
6
.4216009E-02
0
4
RINPRI
.1568671E-02
6
.6938879E-02
RINPRI
1
5
.1487977E-03
-.5481232E-03
7
0
RPOTPRI
6
.1436997E-03
7
-.7527827E-03
1
RPOTPRI
7
.435888 6E-04
-.6344127E-04
8
0
8
RACP
.4085505E-04
-.7684368E-04
8
1
RACP
9
.3609794E-02
-.2231235E-02
2
ADJIN
1
10
.1220451E-02
-.7920840E-03
2
2
11
ADJIN
.1279686
.6140002
5
1
SOILD
12
.7137420E-03
.5584053E-02
1
3
13
CP
.5168156E-03
.1372142E-02
3
2
14
CP
.4348114E-02
-.3749035E—02
POTPROD
11
1
15
.5961182E-03
2
-.1631429E-02
16
POTPROD
11
.1046695E-02
-.5580732E-02
DEBT
12
1
17
.1478748E-02
-.3344396E-03
DEBT
12
2
18
.4351661E-02
.4119962E-02
1
19
ADJYLD
1
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
10
E
EP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982OBSERVATIONS
28
9
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
R**2
.88035647
.64106940
RBAR**2
SSR
2.3752789
.51373133
SEE
DURB IN-WATSON 1.61814119
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
*******
★* ★
***
************
************
-. 1603628E-01
1
CONSTANT
0
0
.1033842
2
WTHR
4
1
-. 1008388E-01
.1685032
3
WTHR
4
2
.6097211E-01
.1550596
4
RINPRI
6
0
10.81519
4.285997
5
RINPRI
6
-1.806690
4.651576
1
6
7
-1.107172
.4412292
RPOTPRI
0
7
7
RPOTPRI
1
-.7135907
.4261123
8
8
.1292539
RACP
0
-.2167432
9
8
.1211474
RACP
1
-.1291159
10
ADJIN
2
10.70411
1
15.47584
3.618998
11
ADJIN
2
2
-.4378178
12
SOILD
5
-71.59320
379.4649
1
2.116457
13
3
1
1.935602
CP
14
1.532512
CP
3
2
3.069629
15
12.89345
POTPROD
11
1
24.32289
16
POTPROD
2
1.767667
11
.7891514
17
12
1
3.103762
DEBT
1.707692
18
4.384927
DEBT
12
2
10.36035
12.90397
19
ADJYLD
1
1
-23.29652
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
2
ADJIN
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
9
R**2
.84916745
RBAR**2
.54750234
SSR
.14443625E1 - 0 1
SEE
.40060545E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.86242357
LABEL
NO.
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
*******
*** ***
***
************
************
1
CONSTANT
0
0
.5247029E-02
.8061855E-02
2
WTHR
4
1
.1313980E-01
-.2802347E-02
3
WTHR
4
2
6985843E-02
.1209148E-01
4
RINPRI
6
0
-.3262793
.3342202
5
RINPRI
6
1
.3627278
.1452281E-01
6
RPOTPRI
7
0
-.1585999E-01
.3440686E-01
7
RPOTPRI
7
.3322805E-01
1
.1697465E-02
8
RACP
8
0
.1007916E-01
-.2096652E-02
9
8
RACP
1
.4920572E-02
.9447019E-02
10
ADJIN
2
1
-.9047536
.8347019
11
ADJIN
2
2
-.1203539
.2822079
12
SOILD
5
1
29.59050
25.24478
13
CP
3
.1650404
1
.6925346E-01
14
CP
3
2
.1195046
-.4470028E-01
15
POTPROD
11
1
1.005425
-.4801861
16
POTPROD
11
2
-.4826416E-01
.1378419
17
DEBT
12
1
.2420300
.6414944
18
DEBT
12
2
.3419347
.2000523
19
ADJYLD
1
1
1.006246
.3760604
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
12
DEBT
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
9
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
OBSERVATIONS
.64593537
RBAR**2
.88197846
R**2
.41066074E-01
SEE
.15177802E1 - 0 1
SSR
DURBIN -WATSON 1.93020673
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
LABEL
VAR LAG
NO.
************
************
*** * **
*******
***
.8264209E-02
-.2393385E-02
0
0
CONSTANT
1
.1346962E-01
.1875254E-02
4
1
WTHR
2
.1239498E-01
.8657720E-02
4
2
WTHR
3
.3426092
.1200909
6
0
RINPRI
4
.3718324
.5738418
6
1
RINPRI
5
.3527048E-01
-.8398946E-01
7
0
6
RPOTPRI
.3406209E-01
-. 8078783E-01
7
1
7
RPOTPRI
.1033215E-01
-.1071113E-01
8
0
8
RACP
.9684141E-02
-.1564810E-01
8
1
9
RACP
.8556532
.2273176
2
1
10
ADJIN
.2892914
.6796503E-01
2
2
11
ADJIN
30.33323
-24.38978
5
1
SOILD
12
.1691829
.1594547
3
1
13
CP
.1225042
.5226452E-01
3
2
14
CP
1.030662
1.019042
1
15
POTPROD
11
.1413018
-.2378612
11
2
16
POTPROD
.2481050
-.3460960
17
12
1
DEBT
.3505173
.1992581
12
2
18
DEBT
1.031503
-1.098396
1
ADJYLD
1
19

SECOND STAGE REGRESSION
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SECOND STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS

EQUATION
1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1
ADJYLD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
19
R**2
.68589153
RBAR**2
.55363533
SSR
.30823069
SEE
.12736824
DURBIN—WATSON 2.00217231
STAND. ERROR
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
************
*** ***
************
***
.2439065E-01
1
0
0
.3305282E-02
CONSTANT
.6164285
2
0
.1404220
2
ADJIN
.5465812
3
ADJIN
2
1
.9751911
-.3512677
.3084550
4
3
0
CP
.3501821
5
3
-.3268418
CP
1
86.70860
6
SOILD
5
1
-34.36273
7
.2590482E-01
WTHR
4
0
-. 5515247E-01
.2930441E-01
8
WTHR
4
1
-. 5456704E-01
.1926288
9
ADJYLD
1
1
-.7256809

EQUATION
2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
5
SOILD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 19821
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
23
OBSERVATIONS
28
RBAR**2
.46867358
R**2
.54738861
SEE
.30765277E-03
SSR
.21769552E-05
DURBIN—WATSON 2.20542215
NO.
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
LABEL
VAR LAG
***
*******
*** ***
************
************
0
-.3031882E-04
.5874595E-04
1
CONSTANT
0
.1040665E-02
2
ADJIN
2
1
.1805888E-02
.1628016
3
SOILD
5
1
.2724043
.4693110E-03
3
.2402535E-02
4
1
CP
.2977499E-04
-.9816573E-05
8
1
5
RACP
■

-133EQUATION
3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
3
CP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982 1
19
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
R**2
.76643897
.66809749
RBAR**2
.88694716E-01
SSR
.14946830
SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.07834527
LABEL
STAND. ERROR
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
NO.
************
*******
*** ***
************
***
.1735331E-01
0
1
CONSTANT
0
-. 2496040E-02
.2184161
-.7007238
2
3
1
CP
.1687298
.1112271E-01
3
3
2
CP
.3006603E-01
4
7
0
.4292092E-01
RPOTPRI
.3524555E-01
5
10
0
EP
.1162898
.3672993
6
ADJIN
2
1
-.9037209
7
.9921632E-02
8
-.5638118E-02
1
RACP
8
SOILD
56.50424
5
1
-144.3254
9
.3733482
DEBT
12
1
-.4644680

EQUATION
4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
10
EP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- ]
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
25
OBSERVATIONS
28
RBAR**2
.51676514
R**2
.55256032
SEE
.59608739
SSR
8.8830045
DURBIN-WATSON 2.29180266
NO.
LABEL
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
VAR LAG
***
*******
************
************
*** ***
— .1729841E-01
.1129269
1
CONSTANT
0
0
.1549068
7
0
2
RPOTPRI
-.8564470
.1583897
3
7
RPOTPRI
1
-.4820829
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EQUATION
6
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
2
ADJIN
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
20
-.06690147
R**2
.20970261
RBAR**2
SSR
.75678352E-01
SEE
.61513556E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 2.52618144
LABEL
NO.
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
VAR LAG
***
*******
************
************
*** ***
1
.1172267E-01
CONSTANT
0
0
.1575938E-02
2
EP
10
.5891574E-02
.2006645E-01
-1
3
EP
10
.4415465E-01
.2053841E-01
0
4
RINPRI
6
0
-.2802137E-01
.3960872
5
8
0
-. 1934824E-02
.6246665E-02
RACP
6
-.3642097
3
0
.1568704
CP
7
SOILD
37.58598
5
0
-11.38404
8
DEBT
.2484300
12
0
.2295099

EQUATION
7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
12
DEBT
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
25
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
.45507661
R**2
.49544131
RBAR**2
.50945947E-01
SSR
.64887237E-01
SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.25925398
STAND. ERROR
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
***
*******
*** ***
************
1
.9636049E-02
CONSTANT
0
0
-. 1812189E-02
2
-.3802137
DEBT
.1512266
12
1
3
DEBT
-.7003362
12
2
.1489704

SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION
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THIRD STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression)
(Three Iterations)
EQUATION
1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1
ADJYLD
PROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
19
R**2
.62365774
RBAR**2
.46519784
SSR
.36929993
SEE
.13941606
DURBIN-WATSON 2.09596743
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
NO.
VAR LAG
LABEL
************
*** ***
ft***********
***
1
.2163012E-01
CONSTANT
0
0
.389 3016E-02
.3908390
2
0
ADJIN
2
.3022994
.3418089
3
1
1.738609
ADJIN
2
CP
3
0
-.2755961
.1829802
4
.2082537
5
1
CP
3
-.8841991E-01
19.51846
51.39835
6
5
1
SOILD
.1468970E-01
WTHR
0
7
4
-.3386603E-01
.1696819E-01
8
WTHR
4
1
-.3069304E-01
.1155854
-.6907024
9
ADJYLD
1
1

EQUATION
2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
5
SOILD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
23
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
.46605088
R**2
RBAR**2
.54515445
.30841114E-03
SSR
.21877010E -05
SEE
DURBIN -WATSON 2.29375258
STAND. ERROR
COEFFICIENT
NO.
VAR LAG
LABEL
************
************
***
*******
** * ***
.5341303E-04
0
- .2922824E-04
10
CONSTANT
0
.9236408E-03
11
1
.1533603E-02
ADJIN
2
.2906946
.1415196
12
5
1
SOILD
.4158935E-03
13
3
1
.2460635E-02
CP
.2582090E-04
14
1
- .1049251E-04
RACP
8

-137EQUATION
3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
3
CP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
19
OBSERVATIONS
.49582379
R**2
.64520933
RBAR**2
.22704969
.10931598
SEE
SSR
DURBIN--WATSON 2.36092495
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
LABEL
VAR LAG
NO.
************
************
*******
***
** *
.1661672E-01
-.
1337338E-02
CONSTANT
0
0
15
.1238843
16
CP
3
1
-.3546329
.7308426E-01
-.1174124
17
CP
3
2
.1616031E-01
.8468300E-02
0
18
RPOTPRI
7
.2331844E-01
EP
10
0
.1001005
19
.2097053
20
ADJIN
2
1
.9890538E-01
.4280367E-02
1
-.8579304E-02
21
RACP
8
-63.09982
27.53650
22
SOILD
5
1
.1714358
23
DEBT
12
1
-.7869099

EQUATION
4
10
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
EP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
25
R**2
.50342190
RBAR**2
.46369565
SSR
9.8585478
SEE
.62796649
DURBIN-WATSON 2.22377057
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
***

24
25
26

*******

CONSTANT
RPOTPRI
RPOTPRI

***

0
7
7

***

************

0 -.2418484E-01
0 -.8712473
1 -.2877638

************

.1110374
.1331338
.1313874

-138-

EQUATION
6
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
2
ADJIN
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
20
OBSERVATIONS
28
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
-1.03429647
R**2
-.50688628
RBAR**2
.84940693E-01
SSR
.14429843
SEE
DURBIN-WATSON 2.53211755
STAND. ERROR
LABEL
VAR LAG
COEFFICIENT
NO.
************
*******
*** ***
************
***
.1868245E-02
.1260973E-01
0
27
CONSTANT
0
.9450478E-02
10
-1
.1257718E-01
28
EP
10
.1692554E-01
0
.7002835E-01
EP
29
.2072605
6
30
RINPRI
0
.2131494
.3047117E-02
8
-.6670007E-02
31
RACP
0
.8892365E-01
0
-.7007371
32
CP
3
21.39935
5
-23.10520
SOILD
0
33
.1645099
34
0
.1944530
DEBT
12

EQUATION
7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
12
DEBT
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 19821
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
25
OBSERVATIONS
28
R**2
.46232686
RBAR**2
.41931301
SEE
.52591186E-01
SSR
.69145820E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 2.25934397
COEFFICIENT
STAND. ERROR
NO.
LABEL
VAR LAG
•

***

35
36
37

*******

CONSTANT
DEBT
DEBT

***

0
12
12

***

0
1
2

************

-, 1470115E-02
-, 2897736
-, 5166752

************

.9327444E-02
.1318472
.1313589
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